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This Article identifies an emerging regime complex in the field of international criminal law and 
analyzes the development of the regional criminal chamber to the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights.  A regime complex refers to the way in which two or more institutions intersect in terms of their 
scope and purpose.  This Article discusses how the International Criminal Court’s institutional crisis 
created a space for regional innovation.  It demonstrates how the development of a regional criminal 
tribunal in Africa is the result of intersecting factors in international criminal justice.  It finds that regime 
complexes can form not only due to strategic inconsistencies as discussed in the literature, but also 
because of the influence of regional integration.  It argues that the regionalization of international 
criminal law is a useful addition to the field of international criminal justice, which has hitherto been 
hampered by the limitations of both domestic and international adjudication.  This Article concludes that 
regionalization of international criminal law is a positive development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The African Union (AU) adopted an instrument in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea to create the first-
ever regional criminal tribunal in May of 2014.2  The court has not come into existence at the time of 
writing.  The Malabo Protocol (Protocol) provides for corporate criminal liability,3 which presents a 
significant innovation for the field of international criminal justice.4  The regional criminal tribunal also 
criminalizes a number of crimes, such as trafficking in humans, drugs, and hazardous waste,5 piracy,6 
terrorism,7 mercenarism,8 and corruption,9 among others.  The Malabo Protocol presents an opportunity 
for African states to alter the status quo in international criminal justice.   
Historically, the field of international criminal justice, like other fields in international law, has 
been preoccupied with crisis.10  As Hilary Charlesworth has articulated, this has led to the de-
prioritization of “issues of structural justice that underpin everyday life.”11  International criminal law 
essentially ignores quotidian crimes, which may undermine the effectiveness of the field because it 
“abstracts crises”12 from the root causes of the field’s core crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.  International criminal law violations are viewed as more severe and deserving of 
action.  Meanwhile, other human rights violations, no matter how prolonged, systematic, or serious 
“recede drably into the background.”13  This has created a hierarchy in which crisis crimes like genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes require urgent action and are the exclusive focus of international 
criminal tribunals like the International Criminal Court (ICC).14  Some may view this hierarchy as 
justified given the limited resources of tribunals and the seriousness of crisis-related crimes, which may 
                                                          
2Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights art. 
16, A.U. Doc. No. STC/Legal/Min. 7(1) Rev. 1 (May 14, 2014) [hereinafter Malabo Protocol].  The Assembly of the 
African Union adopted the Malabo Protocol on June 30, 2014 at its Twenty-Third Ordinary Session.  See A.U. Doc. 
No. Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII) (June 26–27, 2014).  
3Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 46C. 
4None of the existing international criminal tribunals provide for corporate criminal liability.  See Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.N. Doc. S/Res/827, 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; 
U.N. Doc. S/Res/955, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Apr. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter SCSL 
Statute].  See generally S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (on the establishment of the SCSL). 
5Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, at arts. 28J (trafficking in persons), 28K (trafficking in drugs), 28L (trafficking in 
hazardous waste). 
6Id. at art. 28F. 
7Id. at art. 28G. 
8Id. at art. 28H. 
9Id. at art. 28I. 
10See Hilary Charlesworth, International Law:  A Discipline in Crisis, 65 MODERN L. REV. 377, 389 (2002). 
11Id. at 391. 
12See Sonja B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times, International Justice Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 1257, 1285 (2007). 
13See Benjamin Authers & Hilary Charlesworth, International Human Rights Law and the Language of Crisis 14 
(Ctr. For International Governance and Justice, Working Paper No. 18, 2013).   
14Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 5 (enumerating the ICC’s jurisdiction over core crimes—genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression). 
  
threaten international peace and security.  The Malabo Protocol represents a radical departure from the 
traditional model of international criminal tribunals because its jurisdiction includes both crisis-related 
crimes and quotidian crimes.15  By straddling the quotidian and the crisis, the Protocol recognizes that any 
violation “implicates both a pattern of conduct and a need for decisive action.”16  The Protocol allows us 
to think more creatively about what the project of international criminal justice should look like—the 
types of claims, actors covered, as well as the appropriate level of adjudication. 
Yet, the efforts to establish the regional criminal court in Africa have been widely derided as a 
thinly disguised attempt to further entrench impunity.  Controversially, the court does not have 
jurisdiction over any “serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in 
such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.”17  This 
immunities provision is in stark contrast with the statutes of other international criminal tribunals.18  It has 
caused significant backlash toward the court from scholars and practitioners.19  The immunities provision 
is a red herring that has obscured discussion of a number of substantive innovations of the court.  For one, 
the provision does not in any way impact the ICC’s jurisdiction and the universal system remains as a 
check.  Furthermore, there are valid legal and policy reasons why inclusion of the provision does not 
render the entire project suspect.20  The knee-jerk dismissiveness toward the regional criminal court 
because of the immunity provision has blinded commentators.  This has led to the failure to consider how 
the regionalization of international criminal law could uniquely position regional mechanisms between 
the system established by the Rome Statute of the ICC and national judicial systems—not to be merely 
complementary or reinforcing, but as essential parts of a robust system of global justice.   
This Article argues that the emergence of the regional criminal court is due in part to the 
influence of regionalism21 in international relations.  It argues that the regionalization of international 
criminal law is a useful addition to the field of international criminal justice, which has hitherto been 
hampered by the limitations of both domestic and international adjudication.  The ICC’s institutional 
crisis has created a space for this regional innovation.  Hilary Charlesworth and others have argued that 
                                                          
15See generally Malabo Protocol, supra note 2. 
16Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 23. 
17Malabo Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 46Abis.   
18Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 27 (detailing the irrelevance of official capacity for exempting someone from 
criminal responsibility); ICTR Statute, supra note 4, at art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 4, at art. 7; SCSL Statute, 
supra note 4, at art. 6. 
19See, e.g., Mark Kerster, What Gives? African Union Head of State Immunity, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (July 7, 2014), 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/07/07/what-gives-african-union-head-of-state-immunity/; Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, 
Leaders Agree on Immunity for Themselves During Expansion of African Court, IPI GLOBAL OBSERVATORY (July 
23, 2014), http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/07/leaders-agree-immunity-expansion-african-court/. 
20See discussion in Part II. 
21Regionalism has spawned “new political, economic, security, and culturally driven projects which sought in 
different ways to find a new space for regions in an increasingly interdependent global order.”  Louise Fawcett & 
Mónica Serrano, Introduction, in REGIONALISM AND GOVERNANCE IN THE AMERICAS:  CONTINENTAL DRIFT xxii, 
xxii (Louise Fawcett & Mónica Serrano eds., 2005).  I rely on the three criteria put forward by United Nations in its 
1945 draft definition for a region:  geographical proximity, community of interest, and common affinities.  See 
Kennedy Graham, Models of Regional Governance:  Is There a Choice for the Pacific?, in MODELS OF REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE PACIFIC:  SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF REGIONALISM 19, 20–21 
(Kennedy Graham ed., 2008) (noting that although the definition was not adopted it is “as good as any other 
definition”). 
  
times of crisis often act as catalysts to action in the field of international human rights law.22  The same 
can also be said for the field of international criminal law, with the crisis between the ICC and the AU 
prompting the proposed creation of an alternative institution.  Prior to this, the AU decided that it would 
no longer cooperate with the ICC in its investigations and prosecutions in Africa.23  African states views 
regarding non-cooperation with the ICC are not monolithic.  Indeed, some states like Botswana, Malawi, 
and others have signalled their displeasure with the AU’s call for non-cooperation.24  Nonetheless, 
because almost all of the ICC’s cases are from the continent, and the court is completely dependent on 
member states for cooperation and enforcement of its decisions, the current strained relationship between 
the AU and the ICC is potentially deeply problematic for the larger project of international criminal 
justice.  This is especially so considering that Kenya received support for a proposal at a January 2016 
AU summit meeting for mass African state withdrawal from the Rome Statute regime.25   
While no legally binding decision has been made to date, the ICC’s failure to adequately manage 
this crisis has led to the emergence of a regime complex.26  Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations.”27  Regime complexes consist of “several legal agreements that are 
created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors.”28  Scholars have 
identified regime complexes in the areas of “climate change, energy, intellectual property, and anti-
corruption.”29  The literature on regime complexes is ever expanding,30 and emerging complexes have 
been identified in the areas of refugee law31 and security.32 
                                                          
22See Authers & Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 8.  
23See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Meeting of African 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec. 245(XIII) Rev.1 
(July 1, 2009), http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/9560-
assembly_en_1_3_july_2009_auc_thirteenth_ordinary_session_decisions_declarations_message_congratulations_m
otion_0.pdf (deciding that AU Member states “shall not cooperate . . . in the arrest and surrender of President Omar 
al-Bashir of  Sudan”). 
24See, e.g., Assembly of the African Union, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.482(XXI) (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/9654-assembly_au_dec_474-489_xxi_e.pdf (noting Botswana’s 
reservation on the entire decision, which endorsed domestic prosecutions of the Kenya cases in lieu of the ICC and 
reaffirmed prior decisions that expressed concern about the misuse of ICC indictments against African leaders); 
Malawi Rebuffs Mugabe’s Call for ICC Withdraw, NYASA TIMES (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/2015/06/01/malawi-rebuffs-mugabes-call-for-icc-withdraw/ (discussing the Malawian 
governments commitment to the Rome Statute). 
25 Agence France-Presse, African Union Members Back Kenyan Plan to Leave ICC, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2016), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/01/african-union-kenyan-plan-leave-international-
criminal-court [hereinafter Agence-France Presse, AU Members Back Kenyan Plan]. 
26Kal Raustiala & David Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L ORG. 277, 279 (2004) 
(defining regime complexes). 
27Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:  Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L 
REGIMES 185, 186 (1982). 
28Raustiala & Victor, supra note 25, at 279. 
29Grainne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance 13 (NYU 
Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No.12-08, 2013); see, e.g., Peter K. Yu, 
International Enclosure, The Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 
 
  
This Article is the first to identify an emerging regime complex in the field of international 
criminal law.  It mines an under-researched area as the scholarship on regime complexes has not 
sufficiently analyzed the ways in which regionalism can inform the development of new regime 
complexes.  Regime complex and regionalism theory help to explain the AU’s decision to merge the 
African Court of Human and People’s Rights with that of the African Court of Justice,33 and add a 
separate chamber for criminal jurisdiction to the new African Court of Justice and Human Rights.34   
This Article is organized as follows:  Part I provides a brief background on the ICC, the African 
human rights architecture, the ICC’s institutional crisis, and the development of the regional criminal 
tribunal.  Part II analyzes how regionalism and regime complexes provide a better conceptual framework 
for understanding the emergence of the regional criminal court.  Part III examines the implications of 
utilizing these theoretical frameworks.  This study has a number of main contributions. First, regionalism 
can influence the development of regime complexes. Next, crises are important predictors of institutional 
change and development.  This Article concludes that regionalization of international criminal law is a 
welcome development.   
 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ICC, THE AFRICAN REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE & THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
This Part provides a brief overview of the ICC and discusses the African regional human rights 
system.  This Part also provides background and context on the ICC’s institutional crisis that led to the 
development of the regional criminal tribunal.  Furthermore, this Part discusses how institutional crises 
are important predictors of institutional change and development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 (2007) (intellectual property); Raustiala & Victor, supra note 25 (plant genetics).  See generally Robert O. 
Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 7 (2011) 
(climate change); Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (intellectual property); Kenneth W. Abbott, The 
Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change, 30 ENV’T & PLANNING C:  GOV’T & POL’Y 571 (2012) (climate 
change); Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021 (2007) 
(intellectual property).  
30See generally Sigrid Quack, Regime Complexity and Expertise in Transnational Governance:  Strategizing in the 
Face of Regulatory Uncertainty, 3 ONATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 647 (2013); Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, 
Reclaiming “Common Heritage” Treatment in the International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 35 (2007); Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Toward Development in International 
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71 (2007). 
31See generally Alexander Betts, The Refugee Regime Complex, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 12 (2010).  
32See generally Malte Brosig, Introduction:  The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors 
and Policies, 6 AFR. SEC. 171 (2013).  
33Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, July 21, 2008 (entered into force Feb. 
11, 2009) [hereinafter Merger Protocol].   
34See generally Malabo Protocol, supra note 2.   
  
A. The ICC in Crisis 
 
1. Crisis Defined 
Perceptions of legitimacy35 gaps have shaped debates about international organizations for 
decades.36  As such, the legitimacy of an organization is largely dependent on subjective determinations 
made by states, groups, and individuals within states on how a given organization is performing.37  I am 
most concerned with states here, because internationally they are the only ones that can enter into treaties 
and form internationally legally binding obligations.  There are of course many different audiences: the 
international community, civil society, and individual actors to name a few.  Although their perception of 
an institution is important, it is not my primary focus.   
International organizations’ claims to legitimacy are tenuous at best because of the lack of a 
“close connection between [them] and ordinary citizens.”38  In an effort to close this gap, there have been 
efforts to ground international institutions’ legitimacy on the record of its democratic membership or the 
extent to which decisions are made based on democratic values.39  International courts face special 
challenges because “they lack grounding in domestic politics and law” such that their rulings appear “as 
foreign imposition[s] on national communities.”40  Accordingly, international tribunals must engage in 
two forms of trials:  actual criminal trials and “virtual or political trials,” where the tribunal competes for 
domestic and international support.41  This is because international tribunals are not simply legal 
institutions; they are also political institutions that have to rely heavily on domestic support to secure 
arrests and access to crime scenes and witnesses.42  As one scholar noted, persuading audiences is a key 
dimension of institutional legitimacy because their judgments are paramount.43  Where an international 
                                                          
35I rely on the definition of legitimacy used most often in the sociology literature wherein legitimacy is defined as 
involving the actual acceptance of authority by a relevant constituency.  See YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 138–40 (2014) (discussing how the sociology, law, and philosophy 
literatures differ in their understandings of legitimacy with the latter viewing it as justified authority); see also MAX 
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 325 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1947) (describing the 
bases for sociological legitimacy). 
36ALISON DUXBURY, THE PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 30 (2011) (noting how Keohane and Nye have focused on international institutions’ lack 
of legitimacy in their scholarship). 
37Duxbury, supra note 35, at 30 (explaining that whether “linked to a particular viewpoint or an objective notion” 
these determinations are still “dependent on the fulfillment of certain criteria,” which is also subject to individual 
assessment); see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice:  A Pluralist Process Approach, 
32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (2010) (noting that the effectiveness of institutions should “be measured by perceptions of 
legitimacy on the part of relevant actors”). 
38Duxbury, supra note 35, at 30. 
39Id. at 31. 
40Mark Pollack, The Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice:  Normative Debates and Empirical Evidence, 2 
(draft paper on file with author). 
41Michael D. Thurston, Should We Press the Victims?:  Uneven Support for International Criminal Tribunals, in 
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION 135, 136 (Henry F. Carey & Stacey M. Mitchell eds., 
2013). 
42Id. 
43Paul D. Williams, Regional and Global Legitimacy Dynamics: The United Nations and Regional Arrangements, in 
LEGITIMATING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 41, 59 (Dominik Zaum ed., 2013); see also Stuart Ford, A Social 
 
  
institution does not reflect shared beliefs in its practices and objectives due to normative changes, or 
because it imposes rules in contexts where supporting beliefs are lacking, it develops a legitimacy gap, 
which in worst cases turns into an institutional crisis.44 
What exactly distinguishes disagreement with particular decisions of an international court or 
general disaffection from an institutional crisis is not at all clear.45  For example, the “crisis” label has 
been used to characterize situations that fall closer to a legitimacy gap,46 or low levels of legitimacy, than 
the institutional crisis currently faced by the ICC.  Helpful concepts in elucidating the distinction between 
a legitimacy gap and institutional crisis are the difference between specific support and diffuse support.  
Specific support exists for international courts where “audiences” derive “substantive satisfaction with the 
decisions of the court.”47  Diffuse support, on the other hand, exists where actors evince “a willingness to 
support and defend the court and its jurisdiction even in the face of decisions with which audience 
members disagree.”48  Identifying the precise turning point where a legitimacy gap becomes an 
institutional crisis is not necessary for our purposes.  In determining indicators of where a given 
institution falls along this spectrum we would look to formal indicators like “adherence to the constitutive 
instrument of the court and acceptance of its jurisdiction.”49  We would also consider de facto indicators 
such as judgment compliance and diffuse support for an institution.50  Where an institution has both 
formal and de facto indicators of adherence to its authority, I postulate that it would make little sense to 
speak of a legitimacy gap.  However, where an institution is wanting in two or more of these attributes I 
contend that it could accurately be characterized as facing an institutional crisis.   
2. The ICC’s Institutional Crisis  
The Rome Statute establishing the ICC came into effect in July of 2002.51  It created a permanent 
institution responsible for prosecuting core crimes52: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts:  Implications for the Success of 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 407 n.2 (2012) (noting that numerous studies by 
psychologists and sociologists conclude that “legitimacy is important to political and legal institutions because 
individuals are more likely to voluntarily adopt the norms of such institutions to regulate their own conduct when 
the institutions are perceived as legitimate”).  
44Dominik Zaum, International Organizations, Legitimacy and Legitimation, in LEGITIMATING INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 3, 7 (Dominik Zaum ed., 2013). 
45Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy & Lawmaking:  A Tale of Three International Courts, 14 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 479, 502 (2013) (noting that a court that is “controversial is not the same as one whose 
legitimacy is suspect”). 
46See, e.g., Molly K. Land, Justice as Legitimacy in the European Court of Human Rights 1 (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2608578 (discussing the legitimacy concerns at the European 
Court of Human Rights due to several recent decisions on prisoner voting, which have caused “[o]utcry in the 
United Kingdom,” as well as decisions that have been criticized by Russia and Germany); see also Ameya Kilara, 
Facing the Demons of the Past: Transitional Justice in Gujarat, 3 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 100, 122 (2007) (explaining 
that a legitimacy crisis occurs when a judicial body’s perceived legitimacy is so diminished that it may “sound the 
death knell of the rule of law in a state”). 
47Pollack, supra note 39, at 6. 
48Id. 
49SHANY, supra note 34, at 139. 
50Id. 
51Rome Statute, supra note 4.   
  
crimes.53  The ICC is based on the principle of complementarity wherein the court will not investigate and 
prosecute cases when states are willing and able to do so themselves.54  Its temporal jurisdiction is limited 
to crimes taking place after the statute came into effect and after a state has ratified the statute.55  Cases 
fall within the court’s jurisdiction if the crimes occurred on the territory of a State party or on a territory 
within the control of a State party, if a State party refers a case to the court or if the crime involves a 
national of a State party, or if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refers a case to the court (if 
neither of the other conditions are met).56  Cases can also come under the court’s jurisdiction by referral 
from the Prosecutor under Article 13(c) of the Rome Statute.   
There are 124 countries that are State parties to the Rome Statute; African States form the biggest 
regional block, with thirty-four state parties.57  Notably, Senegal was the first country in the world to 
ratify the Rome Statute, which symbolizes “Africa’s early support for the idea of a permanent [ICC].”58  
The ICC is currently conducting investigations and prosecutions in eight countries in Africa:  the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Uganda, the Darfur region 
of Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.59  Five of these situations were the result of “self-
referrals” by the countries for investigations and possible prosecutions.60   
The Rome Statute that established the ICC was supposed to create a comprehensive international 
institution, but has failed to garner universal support from powerful states like the U.S., Russia, and 
China.61  For example, the U.S. enacted the American Service Members Protection Act of 2002.62  It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52The crime of aggression was also included in the Rome Statute as a placeholder.  Id.  There was some 
definitional agreement at the Assembly of State Parties on what the contours of the crime are and what the 
jurisdictional prerequisites would be.  This resulted in a compromise document, which postpones decision on the 
crime of aggression until 2017.  See generally Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court on the Crime of Aggression (June 11, 2010), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2010/CN.651.2010-
Eng.pdf. 
53Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 5. 
54Id. at arts. 1, 17(1)(a).  The ICC will also not investigate in cases of double jeopardy or where a case is not of 
sufficient gravity.  Id. at art. 17(1)(c)–(d). 
55Id. at art. 11. 
56Id. at art. 13.   
57The State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 03, 2016) [hereinafter State Parties to the Rome Statute]. 
58Charles C. Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 445, 446 (2009). 
59All Situations, ICC, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited Mar. 03, 
2016) [hereinafter ICC Situations]. 
60Id. (noting the five countries that referred situations:  the DRC, the CAR, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali).  Self-
referrals are provided for under Article 14 of the Rome Statute.  Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 14.  The 
situations in Darfur, Sudan, and Libya involved UNSC referrals, which I will discuss in detail below.  See Part II.  
Lastly, Côte d’Ivoire voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.  See Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. 
ICC-02/11-01/11, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276751.pdf.  
61State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 56 (noting that 123 countries are state parties to the Rome Statute); 
see also de Búrca, Keohane & Sabel, supra note 28, at 10 (noting how the court was established by mostly European 
states and remarking on the absence of the United States from the ICC). 
62American Service Members Protection Act of 2002 § 2001 et seq., 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2002). 
  
known as the “Hague Invasion Act,” because it provides for the use of military force against any country 
that hands over a U.S. national to the ICC.63  The U.S. signed several “Bilateral Immunity Agreements” 
with developing countries who faced the prospect of losing all financial, military, and humanitarian aid, if 
they failed to sign.64  These agreements generally provide that countries will not hand over U.S. nationals 
to the ICC without first securing the U.S. government’s consent.  Approximately thirty-six African 
countries have signed them.65  The Bilateral Immunity Agreements served to insulate the U.S. further 
from the reach of the court.  Yet, since the U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute, it was within its rights 
to conclude such agreements.66  However, for state parties to the Rome Statue, their participation in these 
agreements violated the norm of pacta sunt servanda.67  Accordingly, state parties to the Rome Statute 
that concluded Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the U.S. would be in violation of this norm by not 
exercising good faith—attempting to shield U.S. nationals alleged to have committed crimes under the 
Rome Statute’s jurisdiction.  The ICC has done its best not to antagonize the U.S. any further, and the 
relationship now is one of “mutual accommodation.”68  Notably, during the UNSC’s debates about 
whether to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC, the U.S. “mooted as an alternative the establishment of 
a regional African criminal court.”69  That proposal was not taken seriously at the time because “it was 
perceived as a gambit aimed at the ICC.”70 
The relationship between the ICC and the UNSC is one of the most crucial issues influencing the 
ICC’s judicial processes and its ability to promote accountability.  In particular, the UNSC’s referral 
power to the ICC has come at a “high cost for the legitimacy and functioning of” the ICC.71  This is 
because the UNSC is an undemocratic and political body.  Moreover, three of the five permanent 
members on the UNSC have not ratified the Rome Statute.72  They can veto any referral to the ICC, 
effectively immunizing themselves and their allies from any potential prosecutions.  Scholars have 
adequately canvassed how the wording of UNSC resolutions referring the situations in Sudan and Libya 
“limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to the relevant state under investigation . . . suggesting a hierarchy of 
                                                          
63See Jalloh, supra note 57, at 493. 
64Id. 
65Id.  
66Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (May 23, 1969) [hereinafter VCLT] 
(providing that a state is “to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed 
a treaty” or begun the treaty ratification process “until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to 
the treaty”).  Accordingly, once the United States made its intention clear not to become a party to the Rome Statute, 
it no longer had any obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, and as such the Bilateral 
Immunity Agreements were not in conflict with its obligations under the Rome Statute.  
67Id. at art. 26 (providing that treaties are binding upon signatory parties and obligations under a treaty “must be 
performed in good faith”).   
68Jalloh, supra note 57, at 495. 
69See William A. Schabas, Regions, Regionalism and International Criminal Law, 4 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 12 (2007). 
70Id. at 18. 
71Rosa Aloisi, A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal 
Court, in THE REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147, 149 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013).  See 
generally Madeline Morris, The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
591 (arguing that the ICC’s authority over non-party states through Security-Council referrals creates a legitimacy 
problem for the court).   
72State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 56 (note the omission of Russia, China, and the United States). 
  
crimes based on the individuals that perpetrated them.”73  The Sudanese and Libyan referrals risk turning 
the court into a “mere tool of diplomacy” and suggest that the Court is a “means to exert political 
pressure” on regimes.74  In addition, the UNSC has not referred similarly grave situations to the ICC, such 
as the current crisis in Syria.75  Given the complexity of the situation in Syria, it is unlikely that the ICC’s 
intervention would have been particularly helpful in resolving the conflict or stopping mass atrocity.  
However, the perceived bias in the selection of cases has only served to further undermine the ICC76 and 
give the impression that political concerns predominate over criminality considerations.77  Accordingly, 
the ICC has been charged with ignoring blatant human rights violations perpetrated by powerful nations 
that have permanent membership on the UNSC or their allies78 in selecting its situations.  Some observers 
have argued that it is not coincidental that the only places where the ICC is investigating and prosecuting 
are in situations where the United States and other powerful states have few interests.79 
The ICC has encountered difficulty in Africa80 and has faced countless questions about its 
relationship with the UNSC.  There are charges that the ICC’s exercise of its jurisdiction has contributed 
                                                          
73Aloisi, supra note 70, at 153.  The UNSC’s referral of the Sudan and Libyan situations to the ICC provided 
immunity from ICC prosecutions for contributing states from the UNSC- or AU-authorized operations that were 
non-state parties to the ICC.  See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 6 (Mar. 31, 2005); see also S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 6 (Feb. 26, 2011).  
For further discussion, see PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE SUCCESSOR 
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1345–49 (2013). 
74José Alvarez, Opening Remarks, How Best to Assure the Independence of the ICC Prosecutor, in PHILIP ALSTON 
& RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  THE SUCCESSOR TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 1350–51 (2013). 
75See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar & Anthony Shadid, Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-
rise.html?pagewanted=all (discussing China and Russia blocking the U.N. Security Council from acting against 
Syria). 
76Aloisi, supra note 70, at 164–65. 
77Peter J. Stoett, Justice, Peace, and Windmills:  An Analysis of “Live Indictments” by the International Criminal 
Court, in TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION 130 (Henry F. Carey & Stacey M. Mitchell 
eds., 2013). 
78See, e.g., Ifeonu Eberechi, “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects”: Exclusion, Selectivity, and Impunity in the 
Enforcement of International Criminal Justice and the African Union’s Emerging Resistance, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 51, 56 (2011); Ntombizozuko Dyani, Is the International Criminal Court Targeting Africa?  Reflections on 
the Enforcement of International Criminal Law in Africa, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 185–220 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012); Jalloh, supra note 57, at 491–95 (discussing U.S. exceptionalism). 
79Mahmood Mamdani, Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order:  How the ICC’s “Responsibility to Protect” 
is Being Turned into an Assertion of Neo-Colonial Domination, PAMBAZUKA NEWS 396 (Sept. 17, 2008), 
www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/50568; see also Victor Peskin, Things Fall Apart:  Battles of 
Legitimation and the Politics of Noncompliance and African Sovereignty from the Rwanda Tribunal to the ICC 22 
(draft on file with author) (discussing how the ICC has steered clear of U.S. spheres of influence and has not opened 
formal investigations in Afghanistan despite widespread knowledge of atrocities committed in these areas).  But see 
ICC Situations supra note 59 (the ICC prosecutor opened an investigation in Georgia in January of 2016 which is 
arguably in Russia’s sphere of influence).  See id. Peskin.  
80For more, see, for example, Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, Implementing the International Criminal Court Treaty in 
Africa:  The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations and Government Agencies in Constitutional Reform, in 
MIRRORS OF JUSTICE:  LAW AND POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 106–30 (Kamari Maxine Clarke & Mark 
Goodale, eds., 2010); Sarah Nouwen, The International Criminal Court:  A Peacebuilder in Africa?, in 
 
  
to neo-imperialism, as the court is perceived as just another tool used by the West to control Africa.81  
There is a common perception that the ICC engages in “selective justice.”82  These challenges to the ICC 
regime are due to a number of factors.  One aspect negatively impacting the ICC’s credibility is its 
practice of issuing indictments during the midst of conflicts.83  Many African states have begun to 
question the wisdom of these indictments and view this practice as decreasing the international 
reputational validity of the ICC because it prolongs conflict.84  Others have argued for the need to take a 
more holistic view of peace and the ways in which the ICC could potentially facilitate peace.85  The ICC’s 
involvement in Uganda illustrates the concern because the indictments against the rebel leaders of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army are seen as incentivizing the rebels to remain fighting.86  Yet, there are also 
questions about how committed the rebels were to peace negotiations prior to the ICC’s intervention.  
Nonetheless, the issuance of indictments in situations where the court is unable to apprehend suspects 
further weakens the court.87  A prime example of this is the indictment of Sudan’s President al-Bashir, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
PEACEBUILDING, POWER, AND POLITICS IN AFRICA 171–92 (Devon Curtis & Gwinyayi A. Dzinesa eds., 2012) 
(discussing the situations in Uganda and Sudan); Peskin, supra note 78, at 15–23 (discussing the situation in 
Kenya); Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism:  The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT?  JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37–46 (Nicholas Waddell & 
Phil Clark eds., 2008); Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11, ICC, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0111/Pages/situation%20index.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016); Karim A. A. Khan & Anand A. Shah, Defensive Practices:  Representing Clients 
Before the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 191, 227–30 (2013) (addressing the impact of 
the type of jurisdiction on defense investigative practices, such as the prosecutor’s request and authorization to 
exercise proprio motu jurisdiction on Kenya and the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to a referral from U.N. 
Security Council on Darfur, Sudan, and Libya).  See generally Angela Walker, The ICC Versus Libya:  How to End 
the Cycle of Impunity for Atrocity Crimes by Protecting Due Process, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOR. AFF. 303 (2014) 
(discussing the Libya situation); John J. Liolos, Justice for Tyrants:  International Criminal Court Warrants for 
Gaddafi Regime Crimes, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 589 (2012) (discussing the Libya Situation). 
81See, e.g., David Chuter, The ICC a Place for Africans or Africans in Their Place?, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 161–83 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012); James Nyawo, Historical Narrative of 
Mass Atrocities and Injustice in Africa:  Implications for the Implementation of International Criminal Justice, in 
AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125–60 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012). 
82See, e.g., Eberechi, supra note 77, at 52; Dyani, supra note 77, at 185–20; Jalloh, supra note 57, at 491–95 
(discussing U.S. exceptionalism). 
83Stoett, supra note 76, at 121–34. 
84Id. at 125–27 (discussing criticisms of ICC live indictments in Uganda and Sudan and finding their timing either 
counterproductive to ensuring stability in Uganda or as possibly undermining peace efforts in Sudan).  
85See Janine Natalya Clark, Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 290–93 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012); see also Geoff Dancy & Florencia 
Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity:  Why International Criminal Court Investigations Increase 
Domestic Human Rights Protections (draft paper presented at the ASIL Mid-Year Research Forum, Chicago, Nov. 
6–8, 2014), http://tulane.edu/liberal-arts/political-science/upload/Dancy-Montal-IO-2014.pdf.  
86For further discussion of this situation, see Nouwen, supra note 79, at 185–87; see also Dawn L. Rothe & Victoria 
E. Collins, The International Criminal Court:  A Pipe Dream to End Impunity?, in THE REALITIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 191, 201–03, 207–08 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013); Steven C. Roach, 
Multilayered Justice in Northern Uganda:  ICC Intervention and Local Procedures of Accountability, in THE 
REALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 249–68 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013). 
87Rothe & Collins, supra note 85, at 191, 198. 
  
who is the “first head of state to be re-elected while facing an international arrest warrant.”88  Al-Bashir’s 
reception in China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and a number of African states following his arrest warrant also 
highlights the perceived lack of influence of the ICC.89  The ICC Prosecutor highlighted the court’s 
ineffectualness when it suspended the Darfur investigations in December of 2014.90  The UNSC has failed 
to take coercive measures under its Chapter VII powers,91 which could compel al-Bashir and the other 
accused to stand trial.  The failure to enforce six-year arrest warrants in one of the court’s most high-
profile cases and the decision to suspend the Darfur investigations undermines the court’s credibility. 
Moreover, the ICC’s credibility is reduced because it is perceived as involving itself in local 
politics.92  This can occur when the ICC issues one-sided indictments in conflicts where the government is 
also implicated in abuses.  An example of this is the situation in the DRC, where the court issued 
indictments against militia leaders, but not any officials in the army, even though they are believed to be 
implicated in many grave abuses.93  The ICC duplicated this situation in Côte d’Ivoire where opponents of 
the government were targeted for indictments, but not any government officials, even though there are 
allegations that both sides to the conflict were implicated in abuses.94  All of the above is not lost on the 
domestic populace and affects the “overall perceived legitimacy of the Court.”95  These issues contribute 
to the sentiment that the ICC is a biased and illegitimate organization with the moniker, the “European 
Court for African Affairs.”96 
As noted above, an institutional crisis is marked by substantial resistance to an institution’s 
authority.  This can be demonstrated by the dearth of diffuse support for the institution and either 
incomplete compliance with its judgments or lack of adherence to its constitutive instrument or 
acceptance of its jurisdiction, or both.  This subsection has illustrated how the ICC does not have formal 
indicators of adherence to its authority from a number of major powers on the UNSC, because they have 
not accepted the court’s jurisdiction.  Of the eight situations in Africa in which the ICC is currently 
                                                          
88Id.  
89Id. at 199; see also Peskin, supra note 78, at 19 (discussing the Chadian and Kenyan governments hosting al-
Bashir and failure to arrest Bashir despite their obligations to do so as state parties to the Rome Statute); Editorial 
Board, South Africa’s Disgraceful Help for President Bashir of Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/south-africas-disgraceful-help-for-president-bashir-of-
sudan.html?_r=1 (discussing the South African government’s refusal to arrest al-Bashir during its hosting of an AU 
meeting despite its being a state party to the ICC and a domestic court order to prevent al-Bashir from leaving); 
Agence France-Presse, Omar al Bashir Celebrates ICC Decision to Halt Darfur Investigation, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/omar-al-bashir-celebrates-icc-decision-to-halt-darfur-
investigation (discussing Bashir’s travel to Egypt and Ethiopia).  
90See David Smith, ICC Chief Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes Probe, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14. 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfur-war-crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan. 
91See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
92See Stoett, supra note 76. 
93Rothe & Collins, supra note 85, at 199. 
94ICC/Côte d’Ivoire:  Gbagbo to Go to Trial, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/12/icccote-d-ivoire-gbagbo-go-trial.  
95Rothe & Collins, supra note 85, at 199. 
96Nouwen, supra note 79, at 171.  See generally Henry J. Richardson, African Grievances and the International 
Criminal Court:  Issues of African Equity Under International Criminal Law, in AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 81–124 (Vincent Nmehielle ed., 2012).  
  
conducting investigations and prosecutions, five were the result of “self-referrals” by the countries.97  The 
nations that provided the self-referrals clearly recognize the ICC’s formal authority.98  African States also 
form the biggest regional block of state parties to the ICC, another indicator of the court’s formal 
authority.99   
Yet, states have had a tendency of “playing hot potato” with the court, by referring politically 
troublesome cases to the ICC even when they can conduct the trials themselves.100  The UNSC has also 
engaged in this practice of referring troublesome cases to the court in order to be seen to be doing 
something.  The ICC depends on states and the UNSC for cooperation to gain access to witnesses and 
documents and to assist with investigations and prosecutions.  States have been able to undermine the 
ICC by the lack of de facto compliance with requests for cooperation not only from self-referring 
governments, but also from other state parties.101  The UNSC has similarly undermined the ICC by not 
following up with enforcement measures on any of the cases that it has referred to the court.  This reality 
has placed the court in the predicament of not wanting to ostracize governmental officials in self-referring 
countries out of fear that they might withhold further cooperation from the court.102  This may also help to 
explain the ICC’s pattern of issuing one-sided indictments.  Self-referring governments have taken 
advantage of this and have used the court for “strategic aims,” and as another “instrument of war,” to 
“delegitimize and incapacitate [political] enemies.”103  Thus, these states have been able to appear to be 
cooperating with the court while actually undermining the court’s ability to be effective.104  Instead of 
                                                          
97 ICC Situations, supra note 58 (noting the five countries that referred situations:  the DRC, the CAR, Uganda, Côte 
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Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-PIDS-CIS-CI-01-010/14_Eng, Case Information Sheet (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/LaurentGbagboEng.pdf.  See also State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 56 
(noting Côte d’Ivoire’s ratification on February 15, 2013).  The ICC exercised its proprio motu jurisdiction in 
Kenya.  ICC Situations, supra note 58.  
98But see Schabas, supra note 68, at 14 (noting that the “so-called referrals were actually actively solicited by the 
Prosecutor” and that while “Africa may have selected itself, it was also selected”). 
99State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 56. 
100ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 72, at 1352–53. 
101See, e.g., Gwen P. Barnes, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms:  The 
Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584, 1587 (2011) (citing Chad’s refusal to 
cooperate with the ICC’s request to arrest President Al Bashir); Lana Ljuboja, Justice in an Uncooperative World:  
ICTY and ICTR Foreshadow ICC Ineffectiveness, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 767, 788–99 (2010) (citing U.S., Chinese, 
Indian, Iraqi, and Israeli non-compliance with ICC policies and requests). 
102See, e.g., Sergey Vasiliev, Between International Criminal Justice and Injustice:  On the Methodology of 
Legitimacy 22 (discussing the apparent motives of self-referring states that “the ICC would only deal with the crimes 
allegedly committed by rebels and not those attributable to pro-government forces or that might implicate their 
leaders) (draft paper on file with author); Clark, supra note 79, at 40 (discussing the need for the ICC to maintain 
good relations with the government in the DRC to ensure the security of its personnel working as investigators in 
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103Nouwen, supra note 79, at 187. 
104For further discussion on how governments can be adept at non-compliance, see Peskin, supra note 78, at 15–25 
(discussing the Kenyan government’s strategy of non-compliance with the ICC while appearing to cooperate with 
the court).  
  
formal withdrawal, some African states have employed less aggressive strategies like delays in 
compliance, partial noncompliance, and, potentially, regime switching.105   
This subsection has explored some of the challenges to the court’s authority, with the proposed 
regional criminal court being the latest instantiation.  The emergence of the regional criminal court can 
also be understood as an attempt to bolster the capacity of the African human rights system. 
 
B. African Human Rights Architecture 
States have established regional human rights bodies in Africa, the Americas, and Europe to 
protect and promote human rights.106  Regional human rights systems have served as both “institutional 
and normative building blocks and instruments for the realization of human rights . . . .”107  Under the 
African regional human rights system, the first institution created to ensure compliance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights108 was the quasi-judicial African Commission in 1981.109  
Scholars and practitioners view the African Commission as a “toothless bulldog”110 because of the lack of 
compliance with its decisions.111 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU)112 created the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights113 in 1998 to be the principal judicial organ for enforcing the African Charter as well as other 
                                                          
105See Eyal Benvenisti & George Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes:  Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
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106See, e.g., DINAH L. SHELTON & PAOLO G. CARROZA, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1019 (2013) 
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107George William Mugwanya, Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms Through Regional Human Rights 
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108African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter ACHPR]. 
109See id. at arts. 30–61; see also ABDULKADER MOHAMMED, AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:  
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(George Mukundi Wachira ed., 2007); see also Muna Ndulo, The African Commission and Court Under the African 
Human Rights System, in AFRICA’S HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHITECTURE 182, 187 (John Akokpari & Daniel Shea 
Zimbler eds., 2008). 
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PEACEBUILDING IN THE AFRICAN UNION:  LAW, PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE 136 (2012).  The OAU was mainly 
focused on decolonization of Africa.  See Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Transition from the Organization of African Unity 
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international human rights treaties.114  The idea of creating an African human rights court first arose in 
1961, twenty years before the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was drafted.115  The 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was created to be complementary to the African 
Commission.116  With the transition from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,117 the 
AU established the African Court of Justice to “administer matters of interpretation arising from the 
application or implementation of the AU Constitutive Act.”118 
The AU was created to promote and protect human rights, to promote democratic principles and 
to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent.119  Yet, membership on the Peace and Security 
Council includes several states that are “suffering from internal conflict and several that had shown no 
respect for human rights.”120  Additionally, the African human rights system has yet to achieve “universal 
ratification,” which prevents the African Court from being able to “effectively discharge its mandate.”121  
At the time of writing, “only about half of AU member states” had ratified the treaty for the African Court 
for Human and Peoples’ Rights, and only five had allowed the court “direct individual access.”122   
The AU has “historically failed to provide adequate resources to its human rights institutions.”123  
Moreover, external partners primarily fund the AU.124  This has limited the organization’s ability to 
engage in “self-legitimating actions because of the fewer resources” at its disposal.125  The AU’s 
overreliance on external funding, mainly from Europe, “has also elevated the status of external audiences’ 
perceptions of legitimacy.”126  The AU has, however, been able to enhance its performance legitimation 
because of its willingness to engage in peace operations in many circumstances where the United Nations 
and other actors will not.127  Yet, recent forays managing conflicts in Libya and Mali have laid bare the 
limitations of the AU, because the AU needed external support for its peacekeeping missions.128 
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The enforcement of the African human rights system’s decisions also remains a problem.129  The 
“foremost challenge” has been “the lack of political will.”130  For example, one study found that the rate 
of compliance with the Commission’s decisions was fourteen percent.131  As such, it is important to keep 
in mind that the mere addition of the regional criminal court is “unlikely by itself to address sufficiently 
the normative and structural weaknesses that have plagued the African human rights system.”132  Indeed, 
the creation of an additional legal institution will not somehow magically resolve real issues of lack of 
political will to address human rights violations on the Continent.  And, in fact there have been numerous 
instances where the African human rights machinery has not functioned to encourage compliance with 
human rights norms from recalcitrant states.133  The issue of non-compliance is not unique to the African 
human rights system.134   
The analysis in this Article is not dependent on the African human rights system being more 
legitimate than the ICC or vice-versa.  The concept of relative legitimacy is helpful here because it 
provides that an institution can be “regarded as legitimate in the eyes of some constituencies and 
illegitimate in the eyes of others.”135  Accordingly, it is conceivable that the African human rights system 
could and would have more perceived relative legitimacy in the eyes of African states than the ICC.  It is 
against this background that the creation of the regional criminal court must be understood. 
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C. Establishment of an African Regional Criminal Tribunal 
The creation of the regional criminal court has a complicated history.  In 2004, the AU 
determined that the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights were to 
be merged into one court.  This merged court would be called the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights.  African states created this body due to concerns about funding and the proliferation of too many 
organs.136  In 2005, the AU operationalized the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights because of 
worries that delays with the ratification of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights would hinder 
the creation of an effective human rights enforcement mechanism.137  In July of 2008, the AU adopted a 
protocol for the merged court.  This merger protocol provided that the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights would have two chambers:  one with general jurisdiction to hear claims on all matters 
relating to treaty interpretation and questions of general international law, and the other with civil 
jurisdiction over human rights cases.138  Before the merger protocol had garnered the fifteen ratifications 
needed for it to come into effect,139 the AU adopted the Malabo Protocol adding a third chamber with 
criminal jurisdiction to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.140  The Protocol requires fifteen 
States to ratify it before it can enter into force.141  At the time of writing, no states have ratified the 
Protocol and only four have signed it.142  Because internal procedures for treaty signature and ratification 
vary widely among states, it is impossible to know how long it will take to garner the fifteen ratifications 
necessary for the Protocol to come into force. 
The AU’s decision to create a regional criminal tribunal as an alternative to the ICC was 
influenced by a number of factors.  First, the AU had been raising concerns about the abuse of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction by European States for some time.143  One of the disputed cases of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction that triggered the AU to action involved a French arrest warrant for the 
Chief of Protocol to the President of Rwanda.144  In addition, at one point a Paris court had issued 
indictments against five serving heads of African States alleging corruption.145  An AU-European Union 
expert panel on universal jurisdiction was subsequently established, which recommended that African 
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States be “empowered to try international crimes on African soil.”146  The AU took up this 
recommendation in February 2009, and requested that the Commission and the court study the 
implications of vesting the merged court with jurisdiction over international crimes.147  A group of 
African experts commissioned by the AU to advise it on the Merger Protocol had previously 
recommended that the jurisdiction of the court be expanded to cover international crimes, but the AU did 
not endorse the suggestion at that time.148 
The AU’s decision was also influenced by a desire to respond to internal member state failure to 
prosecute gross human rights violations.  For example, Belgium initially wanted Senegal to extradite 
former Chadian President, Hissène Habré (who was exiled in Senegal) to prosecute him for torture among 
other alleged crimes.149  Senegal refused to extradite him to Belgium and contended that they lacked the 
power to prosecute him domestically.150  A sub-regional court in West Africa held that Habré could only 
be tried by an ad hoc international court and not the domestic courts of Senegal, which at the time lacked 
jurisdiction.151  The main judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
ordered Senegal to extradite Habré to Belgium if it did not put him on trial in Senegal without delay.152  In 
response, Senegal amended its ex post facto laws and enacted laws for a number of international crimes to 
enable it to try Habré.153  The delay in Senegal’s prosecution of Habré spurred the AU to create a forum to 
prosecute international crimes at the regional level as opposed to relying on the judiciaries of individual 
member States.154 
The ICC’s intervention in Kenya was an additional factor driving the Malabo Protocol.155  The 
ICC indicted six individuals for their alleged involvement in post-election violence that took place in 
Kenya in 2007–2008.156  Yet, others like the former Prime Minister Ralia Odinga and the former 
President Mwai Kibaki, who are arguably the individuals most responsible for actions taken by their 
subordinates, have been “glaringly absent from the Court’s attention.”157  Remarkably, the current 
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President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and the prime minister were elected into power while under an ICC 
indictment.158  Notably, by the end of 2013, three of the six Kenyan cases were dismissed for lack of 
evidence with a number still on the verge of collapse.159  The ICC’s high-profile case against President 
Kenyatta collapsed in December of 2014 in spectacular fashion due to insufficient evidence.160  Now that 
the majority of the Kenyan cases have collapsed, it remains to be seen whether there will be sufficient 
political will to ensure that the Malabo Protocol comes into effect.  Yet, the continued almost exclusive 
focus of the ICC’s jurisdiction in Africa may mean that political will to formulate an African regime may 
be forthcoming.   
The AU’s adoption of the Malabo Protocol has been characterized as “revolutionary” because it 
would create the world’s first regional criminal tribunal.161  The regional criminal court will be composed 
of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appellate Chamber.162  The regional criminal chamber 
will have jurisdiction over crimes covered under the Rome Statute.163  It also expands international 
criminal law by punishing the following systemic quotidian crimes:  unconstitutional change of 
government,164 piracy,165 terrorism,166 mercenarism,167 corruption,168 trafficking of humans, drugs, and 
hazardous waste,169 and money laundering among others.170   
The regional criminal court has both limited and expansive jurisdiction over these crimes.  It can 
only exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed after the Protocol enters into force.171   When the 
Protocol enters into force, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government, and the Peace and 
Security Council172 of the AU, as well as State parties, and the independent prosecutor173 can submit cases 
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to the court.174  The court can only exercise its jurisdiction where a State accepts its jurisdiction, where 
the crime was committed on the territory of the State, where the accused or victim is a national of the 
state, and when the vital interests of a state are threatened by the extraterritorial acts of non-nationals.175  
The court does not have jurisdiction over persons under the age of eighteen during the alleged 
commission of the crime.176  The court’s jurisdiction is also expansive because it provides for corporate 
criminal liability,177 which is something over which none of the existing international criminal tribunals 
have jurisdiction.178  The AU inserted the controversial immunity provision into the Malabo Protocol 
during the last rounds of negotiations.179  Some civil society groups very much contested its inclusion.180  
I discuss the corporate criminal liability provision and immunities provision in detail below.181  
While there has been some scholarship on the regional criminal court, what little has been written 
has focused on the principle of complementarity182 and the legality of the regional criminal chamber vis-
à-vis the ICC.183  A few scholars have focused on the paucity of national judicial mechanisms to 
prosecute grave international crimes in Africa as the reason for the overrepresentation of African cases 
before the ICC.184  Commentators sympathetic to the regional criminal court have categorized it as an 
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example of positive complementarity185 and have sought to define clearly the relationship between the 
ICC and the proposed regional criminal court.186  On the other hand, skeptics fear that any regional court 
will only insulate the “dictators club” from facing international criminal justice.187  They view it as 
potentially undermining the ICC regime.188  Some commentators have focused on logistical concerns such 
as the practical problems of implementation, staffing, and funding of the proposed court.189  This Article 
focuses on an uncharted area of these debates and provides a more nuanced analysis of the emergence of 
the regional criminal court.   
 
II. REGIONALISM, REGIME COMPLEXES, & THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
This Part identifies an emerging regime complex in the field of international criminal law.  
Additionally, this Part demonstrates that regionalism can influence the development of regime complexes.  
Moreover, this Part shows that the regionalization of international criminal law may be an increasing 
trend. 
 
A. Regionalism & the Emergence of an African Regional Criminal Court  
Regionalism as used in this Article refers to regional integration.  Regional integration requires 
the pooling of national sovereignty.190  Regional integration generally begins with economic integration, 
and much has been written about this topic.191  The integration of states into new political and economic 
units is largely a response to globalization.192  Indeed, the “new wave of regionalism relates to the current 
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transformation of the world order, and is associated with or caused by certain structural changes of and in 
the global system, including the restructuring of the nation-state and the growth of interdependence, 
transnationalism,” and globalization.193  States form regional institutions because they recognize there are 
challenges, which they cannot effectively address independently.194  The new regionalism includes 
“economically oriented objectives, but also environmental, political, social, and democratic objectives.”195  
It also incorporates multilevel regional arrangements and reflects “a vastly increased density, breadth, and 
range of interactions above, between, and below states.”196  The foremost example of regional integration 
is the European Union.197  Regional integration in Europe has demonstrated that it is a long and complex 
process.198  Scholars have classified the AU and the European Union as hybrids in terms of regional 
integration because states retain national sovereignty in some areas, but not others.199 
  
1. Regionalism in Africa 
The move toward deepening regionalism in Africa can be explained by a confluence of factors, 
one of which is the desire to further ideological solidarity within the region.200  The Pan-Africanist project 
of “forging closer unity between African States as well as between African peoples within the continent . . 
. has a long history.”201  Pan-Africanism has a “strong imprint on African political thinking and 
sensitivities, and covers cultural, political, and economic dimensions.”202  Although Pan-Africanism has a 
long and complex trajectory from pre-independence to the present, its first institutional manifestation was 
the Organization of African Unity.203  The creation of the AU is the next instantiation of the Pan-
Africanist project and the move toward greater African integration.204 
The creation of the African Economic Community205 and various sub-regional economic 
communities206 demonstrates deepening regionalism in Africa.  These communities were expected to lead 
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to the development of a common market “embracing the whole continent.”207  The slow pace of economic 
integration on the continent208 has not stopped these communities from expanding their reach.  Like other 
regional integrative institutions, these communities’ spheres of influence expanded to include other 
matters not simply limited to economics.  At the sub-regional level, some of the courts established to 
adjudicate economic matters had their jurisdiction extended explicitly to include cases involving human-
rights violations. This was the case with the Economic Community for West African States Community 
Court of Justice.209  Other courts expanded their mandate through judicial interpretation, as happened with 
the Southern African Development Community Tribunal210 and the East African Court of Justice.211  
Some of the sub-regional communities like the East African Community have even considered expanding 
the jurisdiction of the sub-regional courts to include international criminal law matters.212  A thorough 
discussion of the varied experiences of these sub-regional bodies is beyond the scope of this Article.213 
At the regional level, the AU was created to accelerate the slow pace of socioeconomic and 
political integration on the continent, to promote sustainable economic, social, and cultural development, 
as well as to establish the necessary conditions for Africa to play its rightful role in the global economy.214  
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court had jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the community treaty, and the exercise of its jurisdiction was not 
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212See East African Community, Report of the 25th Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers, June 30, 
2012, EAC/EX/CM25/2012. 
213See generally Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 132.  
214AU Constitutive Act, supra note 116, at art. 3(c), (i)–(j).   
  
Similar to how regional integration in Europe developed to include greater emphasis on human rights,215 
African states founded the AU with a stronger commitment to human rights than its predecessor, the 
Organization of African Unity.216  For example, the AU can even suspend member states in the event of 
an unconstitutional change in government.217  The AU Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance 
envisioned an AU court with the ability to prosecute “perpetrators of unconstitutional change of 
government.”218  This proposed court can be seen as a precursor to the regional criminal tribunal.  Given 
the many objectives of the AU, as well as its enhanced role in maintaining peace and security,219 it is a 
matter of logical progression that regional integration in Africa would develop to encompass both 
quotidian criminal law and international criminal law matters.220  For instance, the AU is the only 
organization (international or regional) empowered to intervene forcibly in certain grave violations of 
human rights and the only organization that incorporates the principle of the responsibility to protect.221   
Regionalism allows for more innovation than may be possible in a domestic or global 
institution.222  This innovation is evident not only in the types of crimes covered by the regional criminal 
court, but also in the attempt to regulate corporate criminality; both are discussed in the subsections 
below. 
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217See African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance art. 25(1), Jan. 30, 2007, O.A.U. Doc. No. 
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218Id. at art. 25(5). 
219AU Constitutive Act, supra note 116, at art. 3(f).  For further discussion, see Roland Adjovi, The Peace and 
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states); see also Pereira, supra note 199 (discussing the degree of criminal law integration in the European Union). 
221AU Constitutive Act, supra note 117, at art. 4(h); Graham, supra note 21, at 28.  The principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect provides for states to act, if need be by forcible intervention in other states, in order to stop 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  For further discussion, see Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, The Right of 
Forcible Intervention in Certain Conflicts, in THE AFRICAN UNION:  LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 335–
33 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf & Fatsah Ouguergouz eds., 2012). 
222In the debate of universal, local, or regional approaches to addressing human rights violations, I have made 
arguments for regional approaches in other contexts.  In my article, Regional Approach to Transitional Justice?  
Examining the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, I proposed 
the creation of regional and transnational institutions to respond to massive human rights violations that occur across 
societies.  See generally Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transitional Justice?  Examining the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 209 (2009).  I 
analyzed the institutional challenges faced in societies where gross human rights violations have occurred across 
nations and argue that where transitional justice institutions have been established without regard to the regional or 
transnational nature of human rights violations, such mechanisms encounter problems of coordination including 
disputes over legal primacy, information sharing, and access to detainees.  I maintained that contrary to the 
preoccupation of the literature, much more is needed than the mere coordination or sequencing of disparate national-
level mechanisms.   
  
2. Regionalism and the Crimes Covered by the African Regional Criminal Court 
Regional integration in “criminal matters could allow states to respond to common security 
threats more effectively.”223  Open and porous borders facilitate common security threats like terrorism 
and human trafficking,224 which incentivizes cooperation among neighboring states.  The borders in 
Africa are notoriously non-natural, which renders these states even more susceptible to transnational 
crimes.  Colonial powers constructed these borders, and when African states obtained their independence 
they maintained them despite their artificiality.  African state borders have caused and sustained much 
instability and conflict in the region.225  Furthermore, the neglect of these border areas has contributed to 
criminality, making these areas vulnerable to armed insurgents and even terrorist groups.226  For example, 
West Africa is particularly vulnerable to cross-border criminal activities resulting from porous borders.227  
Some of these activities involve the illicit trafficking of arms and human beings, especially women and 
children.228  Another example is the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in 
the Great Lakes region,229 which fuels and sustains conflicts.230  Yet another example is the spate of 
terrorists’ attacks that have taken place in the East Africa region.  Kenya has been particularly vulnerable 
to these attacks from neighboring Somalia.231  The inclusion of these transnational crimes responds to the 
needs of both hegemons and less powerful states in the region.  For example, criminal activities such as 
the robust drug trade in West Africa and the Sahel region, the recent outbreak of terrorist attacks in 
Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali resulting from the porous borders in that same subregion, and the 
unregulated arms trade emerging from Libya’s collapse are all priorities for powerful and weaker states 
alike.  The frequency and pervasiveness of these crimes ultimately compromises the security and stability 
of many African states.  
Unsurprisingly, most of the quotidian crimes that the regional criminal court has jurisdiction over 
are crimes involving common security threats,232 including unconstitutional change of government,233 
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African countries, the condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government by the AU Constitutional Act, the 
need to allocate natural resources equitably, and the imposition of anti-terrorism laws in Ethiopia to combat terrorist 
 
  
piracy,234 terrorism,235 mercenarism,236 trafficking in persons, drugs, and hazardous waste,237 as well as 
the illicit exploitation of natural resources.238  Because many of the conflicts or common security threats 
in Africa tend to diffuse or have a contagion effect, a regional tribunal may be the best placed institution 
to adequately address the many different groups.  A regional approach is useful where regional conflict 
contagion exists, because regional conflicts span territories with different sovereigns.239  A regional 
approach recognizes the interconnectedness of conflicts.  Regional institutions can be created with 
mandates, which do not ignore regional dynamics.240  A regional approach makes sense where massive 
violations have occurred across States because, “while international crimes are of concern to the entire 
international community, the peace and security implications of such crimes are often greatest within the 
region where the crimes occur.”241 
Not all of the crimes in the Malabo Protocol are defined to require a trans-border element.  For 
example, the Protocol also criminalizes corruption.242  Sonja Starr put forward strong legal arguments for 
international criminal tribunals to prosecute grand governmental corruption.  She forcefully argues that 
the “large-scale ransacking of treasuries by heads of state and their associates,” results in catastrophic 
consequences to vulnerable populations.243  It is not necessary to rehash those arguments here.  It suffices 
to say that socioeconomic injustice and structural violence are at the “heart of many modern conflicts.”244  
Dr. Paul Farmer defined structural violence as “describing social arrangements that put individuals and 
populations in harm’s way.  The arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the political 
and economic organization of [a society]; they are violent because they cause injury to people.”245  Yet 
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the field of international criminal law rarely takes this into account.  Breaking with this mold, the Malabo 
Protocol recognizes both the background and foreground of international criminal law violations.  It 
recognizes that massive atrocity and the core crimes of the field do not take place in a vacuum, but instead 
are embedded in systems of criminality.246  It is entirely rational that African states would seek regional 
cooperation to “facilitate the development of common rules or principles,” regarding quotidian crimes.247  
This could lead to greater consistency in legal provisions and perhaps even greater deterrence regionally 
of both quotidian and crisis crimes.  
The regional criminal court also allows states to cooperate on more matters than they would 
otherwise be able to in a multilateral institution like the ICC.  States form regional organizations because 
it may be easier to further their interests there than in a global institution.  This phenomenon is not unique 
to the field of international criminal law.  For example, when trade negotiations stalled at the World Trade 
Organization a number of states moved to conclude regional free trade agreements instead of 
concentrating on the more global process.248  Similarly, states debated many of the crimes included in the 
Protocol for the regional criminal court during the earlier negotiations for the Rome Statute, but decided 
against including them.249  Terrorism and drug trafficking were some of the crimes considered during the 
discussions leading up to the Rome Statute.250  In fact, the idea for the ICC was originally conceived from 
Caribbean states seeking a solution to transnational drug trafficking.251  Due to the numerous states 
engaged in the negotiations for the Rome Statute, it was not possible to agree upon a definition for a 
number of the proposed crimes.  Many were seen as insufficiently grave to be included in the Rome 
Statute.252  In the Malabo Protocol, African states decided to expand the number of crimes deserving of 
regional, if not international, attention.  
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3. Regionalism & Corporate Criminal Liability in the African Regional Criminal 
Court 
The regional criminal court also provides for corporate criminal liability.253  This is unique among 
international criminal tribunals. In fact, none of the existing international criminal tribunals have 
jurisdiction over corporate criminal liability.254  The punishment of corporations for international criminal 
law violations is not entirely without precedent.  Following the Allied defeat of the Nazi regime after 
World War II, the Allied Control Council passed laws aimed at punishing the corporations that were 
complicit with the Nazi regime.255  The Council’s passing of Control Council Law No. 9 is a precedent 
for attempting to hold corporations accountable for international law violations.  The Allied Control 
Council also established the Nuremberg tribunal through Control Council Law No. 10 to bring criminal 
prosecutions against the Nazi industrialists who ran I.G. Farbenindustrie among others.256  The 
Nuremburg prosecutors considered bringing charges against I.G. Farbenindustrie and other corporations 
and did not perceive there to be any bar to such prosecutions under international law.257  Although no 
criminal prosecutions were brought against corporations during the Nuremberg trials, this may simply 
reflect a determination that “other remedies had already been enacted.”258  For example, the Allies 
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“dismantled I.G. Farbenindustrie to ensure that the company would not keep profits earned through illicit 
support of the German war effort, and this remedy may have been viewed as more severe and appropriate 
than a criminal conviction.”259   
Corporate criminal liability is a complex issue both internationally and domestically.  Some 
courts have mistakenly interpreted the non-prosecution of corporations at Nuremberg as determinative of 
whether international law provides for corporate criminal liability.260  A number of jurisdictions provide 
that criminal liability necessitates having a mens rea, which is difficult to ascribe “to an abstract juristic 
person.”261  The regional criminal tribunal’s provision for corporate criminal liability puts pressure on the 
prevailing legal landscape both within and outside of Africa.  This regional innovation in the field of 
international criminal justice will help to clarify the status of corporate criminal liability.  It also presents 
a number of opportunities for the field of international criminal law.  The regional court could allow for 
greater coordination on the regulation of corporate activity, and allow states to respond more effectively 
to the challenges posed by large corporations.   
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are economic entities operating in more than one country or a 
cluster of economic entities operating in two or more countries.262  Efforts to regulate their activities 
present a host of challenges, especially for the governments of developing countries.  With the age of 
globalization marked by the increased mobility of capital and competition among states to attract foreign 
direct investment, individual developing countries are dissuaded from taking measures that would place 
additional burdens on MNCs to comply with human rights obligations.263  These countries would 
normally be scared of any initiatives that would potentially drive away MNCs and foreign direct 
investment.  Global efforts toward regulation of MNCs have led to the proliferation of numerous 
standards of conduct, which vary in their content, participation, arrangements for monitoring, and include 
various forms of accountability that have proven unsatisfactory.264   
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The regional criminal court could allow for greater accountability for corporations then is 
currently possible at the domestic or international level.  This is especially so if African states establish 
any extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters arrangements.265  The “Trafigura” incident in 
Côte d’Ivoire is emblematic of why regional cooperation on corporate criminal accountability is needed.  
In August of 2006, a ship named the Probo Koala charted by the Dutch-based oil and service shipping 
company Trafigura Beheer BV, offloaded toxic waste.  The Probo Koala left the waste at the port of 
Abidjan, the capital city of Côte d’Ivoire, a West-African nation.266  A local contractor of Trafigura 
disposed of the waste at approximately eighteen open-air sites in and around the city of Abidjan.267  The 
ship had attempted to discharge this waste in Amsterdam, but was unable to due to the toxicity of the 
waste.268  Following the toxic dumping in Abidjan, people living near the discharge sites began to suffer 
from a range of illnesses including nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, breathlessness, headaches, skin damage, 
and swollen stomachs.269  The exposure to this waste caused the death of sixteen people, and more than 
100,000 people sought medical attention.270  Trafigura denied any wrongdoing.271  In early 2007, the 
company paid approximately $195 million for cleanup to the Ivorian government.272  The Ivorian 
government waived its right to prosecute the company.273  Today, almost ten years after the dumping of 
large quantities of toxic waste in Côte d’Ivoire, despite the huge numbers of people affected, international 
coverage of the issue, and several legal proceedings, there remains no effective national, regional, or 
international mechanism to prevent and address a similar disaster.274 
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According to a three-year investigative report by Amnesty International and Greenpeace, “too 
little has been done to strengthen national and international regulations, even after the scale of the toxic 
dumping became clear.”275  Greenpeace International Executive Director Kumi Naidoo stated:  
[Trafigura is] a story of corporate crime, human rights abuse and governments’ failure to 
protect people and the environment.  It is a story that exposes how systems for enforcing 
international law have failed to keep up with companies that operate transnationally, and 
how one company has been able to take full advantage of legal uncertainties and 
jurisdictional loopholes, with devastating consequences.276   
The victims of Trafigura’s toxic dumping in Côte d’Ivoire were not able to seek redress in their domestic 
judiciary.  They had to seek justice in Europe, which ultimately proved unsatisfactory.277  The regional 
criminal court could provide an avenue for seeking corporate criminal liability in Africa.278  As noted 
above, the regional criminal court criminalizes trafficking in hazardous waste,279 which is something that 
none of the existing international criminal tribunals have jurisdiction over.280  African states may be 
particularly sensitive to concerns about toxic waste, given a history of negative external interventions.281  
The failure of both domestic and international institutions to deal with corporate criminal responsibility or 
complicity in the commission of international and transnational crimes adequately, has created a space for 
African states to innovate and attempt to change the status quo by utilizing a regional institution.   
This section has shown that the regional criminal tribunal presents an opportunity for African 
states to alter the status quo of international criminal justice.  The Malabo Protocol provides more 
protection against certain crimes and explicitly allows for the prosecution of legal entities, which is more 
than what is currently permitted in the field of international criminal law.282  African states are attempting 
to develop a number of regional customary norms.  The formation of regional customary international law 
“allows for a few states existing in a given region, bound together perhaps by the same culture or 
common attributes, to recognize certain practices among themselves as constituting international law.”283  
The ICJ, the primary judicial branch of the United Nations, has recognized the existence of regional 
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customary law and has held that it is the state’s burden to prove that the customary norm exists.284  
African states are attempting to form an alternative regime, which will allow them to criminalize certain 
activities of common concern regionally, and to increase the number and kind of actors subject to 
criminal liability. 
 
B. Regime Complexes, Regime Shifts, & the Development of the Regional Criminal Court 
1. Regime Complexes & the Regional Criminal Court 
The growth of international institutions has been marked by a concomitant increase in 
international regimes.285  Recalling that regime complexes are an “array of partially overlapping and 
nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area.”286  One can think of nested or multiple 
institutions with authority over the same or similar issue areas, wherein obligations may or may not 
contradict one another.287  Scholars have argued that regime complexes emerge because of the distribution 
of interests weighted by power.288  That is, when the interests of powerful actors are sufficiently similar 
across a broad issue area, then you are more likely to see the development of a singular regulatory regime.  
However, when interests differ and there is increased uncertainty, the development of smaller “clubs of 
cooperation” or regime complexes will develop.289  Regime complexes form where there is an overlap of 
governance activities.290  They result because of “[d]isaggregated decision making in the international 
legal system[,] [which] means that agreements reached in one forum do not automatically extend to, or 
clearly trump, agreements developed in other forums.”291  This phenomenon is heightened when it comes 
to international courts because “[t]here is no hierarchy in the international judicial arena.”292  This Article 
starts the conversation on how regime complexes can also emerge due to increased regionalization, as this 
has not been given sufficient attention in the literature.   
Salient characteristics of regime complexes are “incoherence, inconsistency, and 
fragmentation.”293  Scholars and practitioners are concerned about the fragmentation of international law 
because there are concerns that it will prevent the evolution of a more egalitarian system of international 
law and potentially damage the integrity of international law.294  In particular, there are concerns that 
fragmentation may lead to norm conflict and hierarchy where courts interpret the same norm differently 
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or where norms compete.295  The International Law Commission’s Study Group has identified three 
different types of substantive fragmentation: “conflicting interpretations of general law, emergence of 
special law as an exception to the general law, and through conflict between different types of special 
law.”296  Fragmentation of international law seems “inevitable,”297 and inconsistency and conflict occur as 
regime complexes develop and new actors and new institutions emerge.298  The key aspects of 
fragmentation of the emerging regime complex that I examine below relate to institutional and substantive 
fragmentation. 
a) Institutional Fragmentation & the Regional Criminal Court 
The field of international criminal law is already marked by fragmentation.299  Generally, there 
are three different aspects of fragmentation relating to international criminal law—institutional, which 
concerns the dialogue, or lack thereof between “diverse international judicial institutions”; substantive, 
which concerns the diversity in substantive criminal law; and lastly procedural, which relates to 
diversification in procedural issues.300  Historically, the only supra-national institutions with international 
criminal jurisdiction were the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals,301 specialized-hybrid criminal tribunals,302 
or ad hoc international tribunals.303  The majority of these institutions existed prior to the Rome Statute 
coming into effect.304  A few tribunals were created after the Rome Statute entered into force, but they 
were either created to prosecute crimes that do not have sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
ICC305 (e.g. the Special Tribunal for Lebanon),306 or were created to prosecute crimes that occurred prior 
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to the ICC coming into existence (e.g. the Iraqi High Tribunal,307 and the Kosovo War Crimes Court308). 
The assumption was that there would be no need for the creation of additional specialized or ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide occurring after 2002 (when the Rome Statute came into effect).309  Yet, the proposed regional 
criminal court as well as the creation of a number of other tribunals has undermined this assumption.  For 
example, the peace agreement in South Sudan contains provision for a hybrid tribunal to investigate war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both parties to the conflict.310  The AU is supporting 
this court as a partial solution to the conflict that began in South Sudan in 2013.311  Additionally, a Special 
Criminal Court was created with jurisdiction over all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
on the territory of the Central African Republic since 2003.312  This will be the first time that a hybrid 
court has been established in a place where the ICC has ongoing investigations and cases.313  Moreover, 
the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria has called for a special tribunal to investigate war crimes and 
mass atrocities in Syria due to the low probability of the UNSC referring the situation to the ICC.314 
All of the above demonstrates that in the same manner that the ICJ, the main judicial organ of the 
United Nations,315 has “never stood at the apex of some universal judicial hierarchy,”316 the ICC has not 
been the apex in the field of international criminal law.  This is especially so when one considers that 
international criminal law can always be enforced through domestic courts.  Indeed, the ICC was founded 
on the basis that it is the “duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes.”317  This can occur either by states directly impacted by the crime(s) carrying out 
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the prosecutions or, as discussed above,318 through the controversial practice of universal jurisdiction.  
Because no singular regulatory regime has emerged in the area of international criminal law to encompass 
all actors, international and specialized tribunals as well as domestic courts have been free to accept or 
reject the ICC’s decisions.  These various judicial bodies adjudicating international criminal law 
violations form part of an emerging regime complex.  The proposed creation of the regional criminal 
court in Africa would expand the regime complex and will likely further magnify the institutional 
fragmentation of international criminal law.   
The existence of institutional fragmentation and incoherence are evidenced by the lack of any 
meaningful connections between the regional criminal tribunal and the ICC despite their coverage of 
similar issue areas.  The Malabo Protocol, although clearly influenced heavily by the Rome Statute, does 
not address the relationship between the ICC and the regional criminal tribunal.319  Instead, the Malabo 
Protocol discusses the tribunal’s complementary relationship with national courts, and the courts of 
regional economic communities within Africa should they be given international criminal jurisdiction in 
the future.320  The AU adopted the Protocol for the regional criminal court after the Rome Statute came 
into force, yet it is completely silent on the ICC.  The Malabo Protocol gives no indication of how the 
courts are to act in coordination with one another.321  This was not by happenstance as the drafters of the 
Protocol for the regional criminal court were very aware of the ICC.  As some scholars have noted, 
“actors will tend to shape their preferences and make their decisions within one elemental institution 
against the backdrop of the other institutions that form part of the process.”322 
b) Substantive Fragmentation & the Regional Criminal Court 
The AU’s action can be understood as an attempt to create a “strategic inconsistency” with the 
ICC.  A strategic inconsistency occurs when actors in an existing regime that are dissatisfied with an 
earlier rule intentionally develop inconsistencies within the regime complex in the hope of changing the 
unfavorable rule.323  The regime complex literature predicts strategic inconsistency, but has not yet 
explained if and how a regime complex “settles” into a stable equilibrium, in which the regime’s core 
objectives can be achieved.  Strategic inconsistencies are meant to put pressure on an earlier rule or alter 
the earlier rule.324  I have already analyzed several examples of substantive fragmentation.  For example, 
where the regional criminal tribunal has sought to create strategic inconsistencies with other international 
tribunals—including the expansion of the crimes deserving of regional, if not international attention,325 
and the provision for corporate criminal liability.326  Another example of a rule that the regional criminal 
tribunal is putting pressure on or seeking to alter is the scope of official immunity.  The AU raised the 
issue of immunity of State officials in its decision not to cooperate with the ICC regarding the arrest and 
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surrender of Sudan’s President al-Bashir,327 as well as the arrest of former Libyan President Muammar 
Gaddafi.328  The AU’s stance on official immunity is related to its determination that indictments against 
officials in power have seriously undermined the AU’s role in peace processes.329  In particular, the AU 
has reaffirmed in its decisions that “the search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede 
or jeopardize efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace and [expressed its] concern with the misuse of 
indictments against African leaders.”330  
Official immunities only attach to certain state officials and only while that particular official is in 
office.  These immunities are termed ratione personae because they pertain to a limited group as a result 
of their office or status and differ from functional immunities that attach to acts performed by state 
officials in the exercise of their functions (ratione materiae).331  As applied to heads of states, official 
immunities evoke the “dignity that was once attached to kings” and the idea of “the incarnation of the 
state in its ruler.”332  To arrest and detain the Head of State of a government would be tantamount to 
“changing the government of that state” and would “eviscerate the principles of sovereign equality and 
independence” of states.333  The ICJ deemed these immunities necessary to maintain international peace 
and cooperation between states.334  Official immunity as applied to Heads of States335 has been relatively 
uncontroversial and applied in numerous domestic cases.336  The below paragraphs will explore what 
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customary international law provides regarding official immunities, in order to fully comprehend how the 
regional criminal tribunal is seeking to shape international law relating to official immunity.   
Customary international law requires both a generalized practice of states around a particular 
norm and opinio juris—that is, it must appear that states are following the practice because of a sense of 
legal obligation.337  With regard to consistent state practice, evidence includes the statutes of international 
criminal tribunals including the ICC, which points in the direction of official capacity as no bar to 
prosecution for international crimes.338  State practice also includes the prosecutions of Milošević,339 
Hussein,340 and Taylor.341  Both the Milošević and Taylor indictments were issued while these Heads of 
State were still in power.  Taylor filed a motion claiming sovereign immunity and requested the court to 
quash the indictment.  The court held that Taylor’s official position was not a bar to his prosecution, given 
the court’s status as an international tribunal.342  Yet, the prosecutions of all three Heads of States did not 
take place until after these individuals were no longer in power. 
African states also have taken the issue of official immunity to the ICJ.343  The seminal case 
involved a Belgium arrest warrant against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the DRC.  In a contentious decision,344 the ICJ held that Yerodia Ndombasi enjoyed immunity 
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from prosecution in foreign national courts under customary international law because he was then 
serving as a foreign minister.345  The ICJ did not provide supporting state practice, which demonstrated 
that official immunity applies not only to Heads of States, but also to ministers of state.346  Also, the ICJ 
did not consider Belgium’s argument that customary international law requires states to prosecute 
individuals alleged to have committed international crimes,347 irrespective of official capacity.348  The ICJ 
in dictum discussed the exceptions where the immunities provided under international law would allow 
for the prosecution of Heads of State and ministers of state.349  One of these exceptions is where 
international tribunals, such as the ICC, have treaty-based jurisdiction.350 
African states are challenging whether a customary international law norm has formed on 
immunity—separate from treaty law and the treaty-based jurisdiction exercised by international criminal 
tribunals.  The controversy usually arises when the UNSC, acting under its powers from Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter,351 refers a situation from a state that is not part of the ICC regime352 for prosecution 
under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.  The Rome Statute bars official immunity under Article 27(2).  
Yet, this provision is only applicable to states that are bound by the treaty regime because generally only 
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Punishment arts. 5, 7, 12, 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, 
AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE:  THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–25 (1995); 
Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:  The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 
YALE L.J. 2537, 2537 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave 
Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 449, 451 (1990).  But see Darryl Robinson, 
Serving the Interests of Justice:  Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 481 (2003) (arguing that while it is relatively clear that states are under a duty to prosecute those responsible 
for genocide, acts of torture, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, that this duty is less clear for crimes 
against humanity and serious violations of the laws of armed conflicts.  Robinson argues that actual state practice 
regarding the duty is unsupportive and has instead condoned the granting of amnesties.  He surmises that the “paper 
practice” supports the duty to prosecute and indicates a sense of legal obligation to condemn amnesties.). 
348See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 344, ¶¶ 56–60.  
349Id. ¶ 61.  These exceptions include first, where such persons are prosecuted under domestic law in their own 
countries; second, where the relevant state decides to waive the immunity; and third, where the individual concerned 
is no longer in office and no longer enjoys the immunities provided by international law, then such individuals can 
be prosecuted by another state provided it has jurisdiction under international law.  However, this prosecution could 
only be for acts committed prior to or after the person’s official position, unless the acts while the person was in 
office were done in the person’s private capacity. 
350Id. 
351The UNSC has previously used its Chapter VII powers, which are aimed at the restoration of international peace 
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ICTR Statute, supra note 4, at art. 1; ICTY Statute, supra note 4, at art. 1. 
352For further discussion, see Jalloh, supra note 57, at 482–85. 
  
parties to a treaty are bound by its provisions.353  For non-state parties to the ICC, officials would likely 
“continue to enjoy [immunity] under customary international law.”354  A treaty like the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC “cannot remove immunities that international law grants to officials of states that are 
not party to the treaty.”355  This is because it is only the parties to the ICC regime that have agreed to 
waive the immunities that international law grants.  Some commentators have suggested that the UNSC, 
when acting under its Chapter VII powers and referring situations to the ICC, can somehow bind non-
state parties to the Rome Statute including the provision waiving immunities.356  This argument is 
problematic because “while the Security Council is competent to adopt measures aimed at restoring 
international peace and security,”357 it does not possess the power to unilaterally impose treaty obligations 
upon a state.358  A related issue is how far the UNSC’s authority extends under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.  For example, whether UNSC resolutions can obligate a state to arrest a Head of State and turn 
the individual over to the ICC.  However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss any potential 
conflict between a UNSC Resolution and customary international law norms. 
African states’ inclusion in the Protocol of an immunities provision359 serves to clarify the rule on 
immunities because, if the prohibition on official immunities is simply a matter of treaty law, then it is 
permissible for states to form treaties that do not contain the prohibition.360  On the other hand, if the 
prohibition is a developing norm of customary international law, then the “reaction of African States” to 
the issue of Head of State immunity “questions the notion of constant and uniform usage or general 
acceptance”361 to meet the first requirement for customary international law to form.362  It also challenges 
the second prong of opinio juris.363  That is because of the inability to establish consistent state practice, 
then by definition states would not be acting out of a sense of legal obligation.  Major inconsistencies will 
prevent the creation of a rule of customary international law from forming.364  The immunity provision in 
the regional criminal court could certainly factor into any customary international law analysis regarding 
whether a sufficient inconsistency has arisen.365  However, complete consistency is not required for 
customary international law to form.366  Accordingly, inclusion of the immunity provision in the Protocol 
may represent an attempt to utilize the normal rules of persistent objection in international law.367  This 
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could exempt African states from being bound, to the extent a norm of customary international law is 
forming that prohibits official immunity.368  Under ordinary customary international law principles, the 
only circumstance where it would not be permissible for a state to derogate from a norm is if the norm has 
reached the status of a jus cogens or a peremptory norm.369  If the prohibition on immunities reached this 
status, then states would not be permitted to contract around it.370  Yet, it does not appear that a 
prohibition on official immunities has become a jus cogens or a peremptory norm.  Before a norm can 
take on the higher quality of a jus cogens or peremptory norm, it must first be established that the norm 
has reached the status of customary international law.371  Because official immunity is recognized as 
customary international law,372 it would be difficult to demonstrate that a prohibition of official immunity 
has reached the level of jus cogens or peremptory norm.  The analysis above indicates that at least some 
parts of the much maligned immunity provision comport with existing customary international law.   
The regional criminal tribunal is also attempting to expand the scope of immunities.  The 
provision bars the prosecution of not only Heads of States, but also of “senior state officials” based on 
their functions.373  This provision is somewhat consistent with what the ICJ has held that customary 
international law currently permits.374  State delegations were concerned about the extension of 
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Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
by States of which they are not nationals.”); id. (draft art. 5) (“(1) The immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction 
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immunities for ministers of foreign affairs, recognized in the ICJ judgment,375 to “senior state officials” in 
the Malabo Protocol.376  Delegations were concerned about the provision’s conformity with international 
[and] domestic laws,”377 as well as the lack of a precise definition for “senior state officials.”378  For 
example, who precisely is included and what are the “functions” that would qualify them under this 
definition is unclear.  The provision’s ambiguity and inconsistency with other criminal tribunal’s statutes 
led to a compromise position emerging.  This position reflected the view that senior state officials already 
had functional immunity under customary international law and Article 46Abis was formulated to state 
that immunities would be provided to “senior state officials based on their functions.”379 
The analysis above indicates that the issue of official immunity cannot fully explain the 
development of the regional criminal tribunal in Africa as some commentators suggest.380  The AU did 
not insert the provision granting official immunity381 until the last round of negotiations when drafting the 
Protocol.  The drafters of the Malabo Protocol were undoubtedly aware that the Rome Statute does not 
provide for official immunity.  Moreover, the Malabo Protocol does not impact the ICC’s ability to carry 
out prosecutions against state officials.  Some have argued that it is nonsensical to establish a criminal 
chamber while “knowing that the ICC can prosecute and punish individuals, including state officials who 
commit international crimes.”382 This is only the case, if you view the regional criminal court as a 
substitute for the ICC.   
Focusing solely on official immunity obscures a number of important phenomena influencing the 
development of the regional criminal court.  As discussed more fully above,383 the Malabo Protocol goes 
well beyond the Rome Statute by covering quotidian384 and crisis crimes, while the ICC only covers crisis 
crimes.385  Additionally, the Malabo Protocol also provides for corporate criminal liability.386  Due to this 
dramatic expansion of the scope of criminal liability, the drafters of the regional criminal tribunal may 
have surmised that greater protections from prosecutions were warranted for Heads of States and senior 
state officials.  Indeed, if the drafters were only concerned with securing official immunity and thwarting 
ICC prosecutions, then there would not have been any need for the drafters to include any other 
provisions to the Malabo Protocol.   
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Moreover, the immunity provision can be analogized to the UNSC deferral and referral powers in 
the Rome Statute.387  While the permanent members of the UNSC were unsuccessful in ensuring a de jure 
veto power in the Rome Statute, they effectively have a de facto veto over prosecutions.  The UNSC has 
the ability to both refer cases to the ICC, and the ability to continually defer prosecutions in exercising 
their UN Chapter VII powers in the event of a threat to international peace and security.  It is unlikely that 
any UNSC referral will involve a permanent member of the UNSC or their allies.  And, in the off chance 
that any prosecution threatens their interests, they always have the ability to defer prosecutions 
indefinitely.  Some permanent members on the UNSC like Russia, the United States, and China did not 
view these protections as sufficient and have been able to immunize themselves fully from potential ICC 
prosecutions by not joining the ICC regime.   
This circumstance where major world powers are not subject to the Rome Statute has not lead to 
the widespread rejection of the ICC regime by commentators, perhaps justifiably so.  It is likely that 
commentators have concluded that even though the Rome regime is imperfect and not universal, it can at 
least achieve some modicum of justice.  The response to the Malabo Protocol has largely lacked this 
nuanced perspective.  For example, approximately forty civil society groups expressed their disapproval 
of the inclusion of the immunity provision.388  The African Court Coalition,389 took a more cautious view, 
supporting the regional criminal court if it comes into existence, but expressing concerns about the 
immunity provision and debating ways to limit its reach.390   
This subsection has discussed a number of legal and policy reasons why the inclusion of the 
immunity provision does not render the entire regional criminal court project suspect.  For example, the 
provision may actually work to encourage state cooperation with the regional criminal court because 
leaders will not have to fear that the court will be used as a tool by more powerful states for regime 
change.  Additionally, the coverage of both quotidian and crisis crimes and the provision for corporate 
criminal liability are significant and necessary innovations in the field of international criminal law.  It is 
also worth mentioning that institutions are developing entities that do not remain static from the time of 
their establishment, but continue to change in response to events and international normative 
developments, as such it may be that the most disfavored provisions of the proposed regional criminal 
court are amended or change with subsequent state practice or interpretation of the Protocol.  In sum, the 
regional criminal tribunal can be seen as an example of a burgeoning “counter regime,” established as an 
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alternative or a platform “to influence the development of existing international organizations”391 and 
international law. 
 
2. Regime Shifts & the Emergence of the Regional Criminal Court 
Regime complexes are discernable by “horizontal, overlapping structures and the presence of 
divergent rules and norms”392 and the field of international criminal law clearly exhibits these qualities. 
Regime complexes create opportunities for regime shifts.  Regime shifts occur when states “attempt to 
alter the status quo ex ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting 
activities from one international venue to another.”393  Intra-regime shifts occur when there is movement 
to a different venue situated within the same regime, for example from a multilateral institution to a 
regional institution.394  Inter-regime shifts occur when there is movement to another forum located in an 
entirely different regime covering another issue area.395  If the regional criminal tribunal in Africa comes 
into existence, this would be characterized as an intra-regime shift as there would be a move from the 
ICC, a multilateral organization, to the regional criminal tribunal in Africa. 
Regime shifting allows “counter regime norms,” which seek to change the “prevailing legal 
landscape” to flourish.396  An example of a counter regime norm is official immunity, discussed above.397  
The AU’s establishment of the regional criminal court can be understood as a way to shift the prevailing 
legal landscape to a regime where Heads of States as well as “senior state officials,” based on their 
functions, are provided protection from prosecution for international crimes.  Counter regime norms can 
seek either to modify the existing rules incrementally or to be more revolutionary by challenging the 
underlying principles of existing rules.398  The creation of the regional criminal tribunal is a fundamental 
challenge to the existing rules of international criminal law.  This is not simply because of the issue of 
immunities, but also because of the expansion of criminal liability to include corporations399 as well as the 
regional criminalization of quotidian activities.400 
This section has illustrated how a number of the salient characteristics of regime complexes are 
evident when analyzing the field of international criminal law:  overlapping legal agreements, 
incoherence, fragmentation, and inconsistency. It has demonstrated how the emergence of the regional 
criminal tribunal in Africa will lead to increased institutional and substantive fragmentation of the field.  
This section has also distinguished the concepts of regime complexes from regime shifts.  Because the 
regional criminal tribunal in Africa has not yet come into existence, it may be too early to speak of a 
definitive regime shift.  Perhaps the most that can be said is that we are witnessing the emergence of a 
regime complex in the field of international criminal law. 
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III. THEORETICAL & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Part discusses the Article’s theoretical contributions to both the regime complex literature 
and regionalism literature.  These theoretical frameworks provide a richer and more accurate explanation 
of the emergence of the regional criminal court than conventional accounts.  This Part also explores the 
potential benefits of the development of a regime complex in the field of international criminal law.  
Additionally, this Part finds that crises are important predictors of institutional change and development.  
Lastly, this Part examines the potential implications of the regionalization of international criminal law. 
 
1. Emerging Regime Complex in International Criminal Law  
There are a number of theoretical and policy implications of an emerging regime complex in the 
field of international criminal law.  The development of a regime complex may mean increased 
competition on international criminal justice issues.  Regime complexes are marked by competition 
wherein the “elemental institutions compete for support from constituents for governance functions and 
resources.”401  One scholar has argued that competition between international judicial forums can also 
occur due to different interpretations of the substantive principles of the applicable law, or because of 
jurisdictional competition where two or more forums are competent to hear a dispute between parties.402  
Whatever form of competition that eventually emerges in the regime complex, increased competition can 
lead to increased inefficiency and “turf battles.”403  It is also possible that a “division of labor” between 
elemental institutions will emerge replacing open conflict because, over time, institutions may learn that 
“mutual accommodation” is preferred as “neither institution gains from lasting conflict.”404 
There are a number of predictions about what may occur in the field of international criminal 
justice based on the regime complex literature.  Regime complexes can create opportunities for powerful 
states to continue to dominate international law-making.  For example, during the negotiations that lead to 
the formation of the World Trade Organization, the U.S. and the E.U. exited the old General Agreements 
on Tariffs and Trade regime where decisions were based on consensus.  They set up the World Trade 
Organization with the higher protections for international property rights that they wanted, then invited 
weaker states to join the new regime as is.405  Regime complexes can also create strategic opportunities 
for countries from the Global South to pursue their respective interests.406  Because of their flexibility, 
regime complexes enable states that have historically played a minimal role in international law 
generation to play a law-making role.   
Regime complexes are characterized by forum shopping, through which actors attempt to select 
the forum that best suits their interests.407  Different rules of access, membership, and participation in 
international institutions empower and disempower distinct actors.408  The creation of the regional 
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criminal tribunal will allow African state parties to the ICC to forum shop between the ICC and the 
regional body.  Of course, the prosecutor of the ICC can still exercise her independent powers to initiate a 
prosecution by requesting and seeking authorization from the court to exercise her proprio motu 
powers.409  Yet, the early enthusiasm African states exhibited toward state referrals of situations to the 
ICC may be dampened, with states preferring to refer cases to the regional court.  The likelihood of the 
UNSC referring cases involving African states that are not party to the Rome Statute may also be 
impacted, if the regional court is seen as a viable alternative.  States may prefer the protection granted to 
state officials in the regional tribunal, or prefer the more expansive list of triable offenses, or even wish to 
see a wider set of actors prosecuted like corporations.   
A division of labor could develop between the ICC and the regional criminal court with the ICC 
focusing on crisis crimes and the regional criminal court focusing on more quotidian crimes, perhaps even 
involving the same country.  The Special Criminal Court established in the Central African Republic 
where the ICC has ongoing cases provides some indication that a division of labor between the regional 
criminal court and the ICC could work.410  This could allow for a fuller picture of the violations suffered 
to develop following a conflict.  A regional criminal court may also be viewed as unnecessarily 
duplicitous of international efforts.  However, the principle of complementarity means that the ICC 
exercises its jurisdiction when states are “unwilling or unable” to exercise jurisdiction.411  The Rome 
Statute only refers to “national criminal jurisdictions.”412  Yet, the existence of a competent regional court 
may mean that states in the region are willing and able to exercise their jurisdiction over international and 
regional crimes.413  The regional criminal court presents another option for African states whose domestic 
judiciaries and related institutions are not able to prosecute international crimes and where the 
international system has failed to pay attention to systemic quotidian crimes or corporations involved in a 
given situation.  The emergence of the regional criminal court may require the ICC to develop its 
jurisprudence on whether the principle of complementarity encompasses regional courts as I have 
articulated above, or whether the principle of complementarity should be interpreted more narrowly.   
Due to principles of lis alibi pendens and res judicata disputes involving the same parties, issue, 
and cause of action litigated at the ICC would be unlikely to be re-litigated at the regional criminal 
tribunal.414  Additionally, the emphasis in the AU on negotiating political solutions to deeply intractable 
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conflicts may mean that a quick resort to judicial measures is de-emphasized.415  This may be a welcome 
development given the need for more flexibility in peace and justice issues,416 and the ICC’s troubling 
pattern of issuing indictments in the midst of conflicts with no prospect of enforcement.  It is too early to 
determine whether the relationship between the ICC and the regional criminal tribunal will be marked by 
competition for resources, governance functions, jurisdictional and decisional competition, or one marked 
by mutual accommodation. 
Politically, regime complexes are more realistic because they do not require that all actors be 
incorporated in a single institution.  They offer significant advantages such as flexibility and adaptability 
when compared to comprehensive regimes.417  Because regime complexes allow different states to sign on 
to different agreements, they make “it more likely that [states] will adhere to some constraints” on their 
behavior.418  At the time of writing, only two states that are not party to the Rome Statute have signed the 
Protocol:  Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.419  It is premature to say definitively whether the regional 
criminal tribunal in Africa will attract the participation of a significant number of states that have not 
ratified the Rome Statute.  However, to the degree that these states were not likely to be a party to the 
Rome Statute in any event, but do ratify the Malabo Protocol, we might consider their participation in 
some regime, which seeks to regulate the behavior of states committing mass atrocity and systematic 
quotidian crimes as a constructive step.  That is the regional criminal court could function as a 
complement to the ICC.  The ICC would continue to function as is, and the regional criminal court would 
offer additional protection allowing for adaptability within the field of international criminal justice. 
Some may view a comprehensive integrated regime on international criminal justice issues as 
optimal, because it is believed that this will encourage maximum compliance with international criminal 
law.420  Yet, it is not evident that a comprehensive regime would necessarily lead to that outcome.  
Moreover, a comprehensive regime encompassing all states does not seem attainable in the near future.  
While a hierarchical system for deciding international law questions might be more orderly and coherent, 
“this has not been the case for as long as international law has existed”421 and there is no reason to think 
that international criminal law is any exception.  For example, before the regional human rights regime 
developed there was concern from the U.N. and other actors in the international community that regions 
did not need separate human rights treaties.  The hope at the time was that the non-binding Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)422 would be transformed into a comprehensive treaty.423  Due to 
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the Cold War, it was impossible to get Western-aligned and Eastern-aligned countries to agree on a 
comprehensive treaty regime.424  This lead to the conclusion of two separate treaties in the field of human 
rights—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights425 and the International Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights.426  Regional systems lead the way—creating regional human rights treaties 
in the Americas that predated the UDHR,427 and in Europe that predated the two covenants.428  A regional 
human rights treaty was also adopted in Africa.429  Regional systems demonstrated creativity and 
flexibility by adopting regional human rights treaties to fill the gaps in international law.430  Regional 
systems also innovated to cover rights and duties not recognized in the main international human rights 
treaties.431  International actors had the same fears that regional differentiation would lead to incoherence, 
fragmentation, and challenges to the universality of human rights.432  Yet, the regional human rights 
system has functioned to strengthen the enforcement of human rights across the globe and fill in gaps that 
the UN system cannot accommodate.433  Given the experience of regionalization in the international 
human rights regime, a similar outcome may pertain in the field of international criminal law. 
The regional criminal court’s innovation in the quotidian and crisis crimes covered, as well as the 
range of actors that can be held liable, push the boundaries of international criminal law in a much needed 
direction.  Other scholars have postulated that regime complexes can also “generate positive feedback: 
providing incentives for a “race to the top.””434  This occurs where countries take stronger action on a 
given issue, which generates imitation by others.435  Prime examples of this are the rights to peace, 
development and the environment, which were included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
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Rights.436  This action at the regional level although maligned at the time, has had generative 
consequences for the development of international human rights law at the global level.  The United 
Nations has established several intergovernmental working groups that are formulating draft declarations 
of the content of these more solidarity-oriented rights.437  Similarly, states could innovate and mimic the 
provisions regarding corporate criminal responsibility, or reach agreement on a wider set of behavior to 
criminalize regionally or internationally. 
This expansion in the field of international criminal law may assist in rendering international 
criminal trials more credible.  International criminal trials generally focus on individual cases, and not the 
complex relationships that exist between individuals, groups, institutions, and other entities that make 
massive human rights violations possible.438  And in the effort to move away from collectivizing guilt 
(which may lead to further violence or recriminations) and instead attempt to individualize guilt, trials 
often tend to absolve other states, corporations, groups, institutions, bystanders, and the rest of society of 
any responsibility as if individuals committed massive violations in a vacuum.439  The focus on 
establishing individual accountability for a small number of crimes may present the opportunity for many 
criminal participants including corporations “to rationalize or deny their own responsibility for crimes,”440 
which limits the ability of such trials to establish the “truth.”441  As such, international criminal trials are 
not aimed at determining the “truth,”442 but instead focus on whether a particular criminal standard of 
proof has been met, based on the limited charges brought and the individuals indicted.  The regional 
criminal courts ability to prosecute crimes the Rome Statute does not cover, and the provision for 
corporate criminal liability may advance the already limited ability of international criminal trials to 
establish an accurate historical record of conflicts,443 and thereby increase the credibility of such trials, 
even if minimally.  This improvement, while not eliminating the history-distorting tendencies of 
international criminal trials, would be a welcome development because it at least potentially lessens the 
problems discussed above. 
On the other hand, regime complexes can also result in a “race to the bottom”444 with countries 
seeking lower barriers to entry into the regime.  That is, instead of states deciding to bind themselves to 
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higher obligations, states can seek to lower their obligations.  Regime complexes potentially allow 
powerful states to avoid international obligations.  The formation of a regime complex may allow states to 
push the boundaries of international criminal law backward.  For example, the regional criminal court is 
the only international criminal tribunal to include an immunity provision.445  Irrespective of what 
customary international law provides as a background norm, the immunities provision is in stark contrast 
with the trend for international criminal tribunals not to recognize official immunity for purposes of 
adjudicating international criminal law violations.  It may be that the flexibility provided by a regime 
complex is undesirable in the field of international criminal law, given the need to maintain certain 
baselines.  It is yet to be determined how and in what direction the regime complex will push the field of 
international criminal law. 
What is clear with the emergence of the regime complex is that there will be increased 
fragmentation of international criminal law both substantively and institutionally.  However, this 
fragmentation is unavoidable in a “rapidly transforming international system” and is a “positive 
demonstration of the responsiveness of legal imagination to social change.”446  In essence, new 
institutions are “an attempt to advance beyond the [unsatisfactory] political present.”447  Further 
development of the regime complex in international criminal law could potentially occur in a multitude of 
ways with states continuing to prosecute international criminal law violations domestically, and/or 
utilizing universal jurisdiction.  Perhaps more states will continue to domesticate international criminal 
law, which would empower domestic courts to prosecute international criminal law violations.  States 
might even create more formal agreements for additional specialized tribunals as has been done in South 
Sudan and the Central African Republic.448  The regional criminal court may even serve as a platform or 
resource for hybrid and domestic efforts at prosecuting international criminal law violations in Africa.  
The court may serve as a resource or guide for regional best practices and help to strengthen domestic 
efforts at adjudicating international criminal law.  Additionally, states may form separate multilateral 
institutions in lieu of, or in addition to, utilizing the ICC.  This Article has focused on the latter as the 
most dramatic evidence of an emerging regime complex. 
 
2. Crisis & International Criminal Justice  
This subsection discusses how crises are important predictors of institutional change and 
development.  The emergence of the regional criminal court can be understood as an attempt to respond to 
the ICC’s institutional crisis.  Or perhaps, the ICC is not in crisis at all and the AU has employed the 
crisis rhetoric to mask its resistance to the ICC.  On this view, the AU’s pushback against the ICC is 
simply an indication of the ICC’s effectiveness.  The ICC is, after all a relatively young institution, and 
what we are witnessing may be no more than growing pains that will be resolved with greater judicial 
maturity.  Yet, what is evident from the analysis above is that perceptions about international criminal 
justice institutions matter, because the “justice that people see and experience shapes the reality of what 
is.”449  Scholars have noted that the ICC should be concerned with “perceptions about its regional focus, 
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and suspicions about the motivations behind this” because the “legitimacy of an institution whose 
predominantly white judges from Europe and America mete out justice to black Africans” suggests that 
the ICC is “universal in name only.”450  The increased skepticism about the court has resulted in threats of 
and actual non-cooperation with the ICC from the AU and others and the potentail emergence of a 
regional criminal court.  A rhetoric and practice of “geographies of justice”451 has developed to address 
the perceived biases of the international system.  Thus, it would seem that international institutions ignore 
perceptions at their peril, as these perceptions can shape institutional success and effectiveness.452 
There are a number of ways that the regional criminal tribunal could help fill the gaps created by 
the ICC’s institutional crisis.  First, due to the existence of geographic, historical, and cultural bonds 
among states of particular regions, decisions of regional bodies may meet less resistance than global 
bodies.453  The Malabo Protocol situates the regional criminal court within a larger judicial architecture in 
the AU.  This might result in international criminal justice issues not being marginalized, as states may be 
more willing to submit to judicial oversight from a regional body.454  Because the Merged Court is the 
primary vehicle for resolving disputes on the continent, states that have acquiesced to the court’s general 
dispute mechanism may also seek to utilize other chambers of the court, including the international 
criminal law chamber.  Further, the existence of two other chambers, one aimed at determining state 
responsibility, and the other aimed at determining individual criminal responsibility for human rights 
violations and international criminal law violations, respectively, may assist in fostering greater 
accountability on the continent.455  In contrast, the fact that the ICC is not embedded within any other 
judicial institution creates little incentive for states uninterested in pursuing international criminal justice 
through the court to join the Rome Statute regime. 
On the other hand, this assessment may seem too sanguine given the experience of the sub-
regional bodies that have adjudicated human rights matters on the continent.  These bodies have all 
experienced varying levels of backlash.456  Most significantly, the Southern African Development 
Community’s tribunal may provide a cautionary tale, as it effectively had its human rights jurisdiction 
challenged and is no longer operational.457  That tribunal however, never had a mandate to adjudicate 
human rights claims, which rendered the tribunal’s decisions especially sensitive to political 
controversies.458  In contrast, the regional criminal court has clear jurisdiction to adjudicate international 
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criminal law violations.  In addition, the ability of a regional hegemon to capture the proceedings of a 
sub-regional body, as was the case with Zimbabwe and the Southern African Development Community’s 
tribunal, may not be easily repeated at a regional level.  This is because there are more regional hegemons 
acting like Nigeria and South Africa, than would be at a sub-regional level.  This may counteract the 
ability of one state to exercise undue influence over the regional criminal chamber.  However, there is 
always the danger of powerful states using regional mechanisms to extract greater concessions then they 
would be able to in a global setting.  We see this happening in other fields of international law such as 
trade.  For example, the popularity of regional free trade agreements like the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership is in part due to the inability of states to achieve similar 
objectives at the global level through the World Trade Organization.  There is no reason to think that the 
field of international criminal law will be an exception to the influence of regional hegemons.  Thus, in 
the same way that powerful states on the UNSC shield their allies from potential prosecutions, we may 
see this duplicated at the regional level. 
Yet, because the court is linked to the regional political bodies of the AU, this may also facilitate 
stricter oversight in the event of non-compliance.  The AU is empowered to intervene in the sovereign 
affairs of other member states in the event of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity,459 
which “evinces African states[’] willingness in theory to respond collectively to grave circumstances.”460  
The AU has intervened in the Darfur region of Sudan, in Burundi, and in Somalia.  The AU has also 
suspended Mauritania and Togo from membership for unconstitutional changes of government.461  Other 
relevant regional bodies that may assist with issues of compliance include the Panel of the Wise, the 
Peace and Security Council, and the African Standby Force.462  Of course, the existence of a connection 
with regional institutions does not completely deal with issues of non-compliance.463  For example, the 
AU has been notoriously silent on human rights violations taking place in Zimbabwe and other countries 
with influential or revered leaders.464  The regional criminal court could then be subject to the same 
criticism leveled against the ICC for lack of sufficient political independence from the UNSC, but this 
time with respect to the AU political bodies.   
Nonetheless, it is possible that the regional criminal court will face less difficulty than the ICC 
has faced in getting African states to cooperate with its decisions.  The crisis the ICC is facing on the 
continent has resulted in South Africa, one of the countries that has played a leading role in human rights, 
announcing plans to exit the Rome Statute regime.465  Moreover, other states have also signaled that 
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African states should withdraw in mass from the ICC.466  Movement from the current crisis with minimal 
to no cooperation with the ICC, to at least some cooperation with the regional criminal court would be an 
improvement.  Cooperation even if de minimus would not be insignificant because the lack of global or 
regional police forces necessitates that supranational institutions use shaming467 and pressure tactics in 
order to get nonconforming states to change their behavior.  These strategies may be more effective “at a 
regional level where states are in constant contact.”468   
The court’s proximity to those affected could also increase its legitimacy and credibility with 
Africans.  Regional bodies may be better placed to respond to human rights violations because of their 
ability to develop more familiar systems of redress.469  For example, in addition to imposing sentences470 
and forfeiture of any property471 following a conviction, the court is empowered to provide compensation 
and reparation to victims.472  The Malabo Protocol also provides for the establishment of a trust fund for 
victims to provide legal aid and assistance.473  While the ICC has similar provisions,474 the regional 
criminal court may be better placed to fashion remedies that resonate.  For example, if the regional 
criminal court follows the lead of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights in fashioning remedies, it 
might order communal reparations,475 or formulate broad reparative and restorative measures476, which 
require the state to end the consequences of a violation through formulating specific policies and 
programs.477  The court might also develop something akin to the margin of appreciation doctrine used by 
the European Court of Human Rights,478 “to avoid determining issues upon which there is great regional 
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diversity” on international or criminal law issues.479  Additionally, the court could seek to work with other 
structures in the AU to provide redress such as the Peace Fund, or the Post-Conflict and Reconstruction 
Framework.480  This is another example of how the court’s linkages with other regional bodies of the AU 
may prove to be beneficial. 
Regional courts are also better “equipped to take into account variations in procedural 
traditions.”481  For example, the court might even require a convicted defendant to participate in local 
reconciliatory procedures as a means of securing reparations to victims.  It is premature to determine how 
broadly the court will construe these provisions.  Yet, the court could potentially be a vehicle for regional 
innovation in providing fuller redress to victims.  This would be an improvement on the “imagined 
victims” of international justice actors.  These “imagined victims” always demand retributive justice and 
support the ICC unquestionably, when in reality, victims have diverse desires for redress, which also 
emphasize reparative and restorative justice.482  This is particularly important in some communities within 
African countries where justice is conceptualized in “reference to communal restoration, inter-personal 
forgiveness, and reconciliation, and redistributive, rather than retributive process.”483 
The regional criminal court could also potentially address charges of a foreign institution 
imposing its will.  The sensitivities to Western intervention in Africa, given the continent’s history with 
slavery, colonialism, and neo-colonialism,484 may allow the regional body to operate with greater 
freedom, and with less perceived baggage compared to the ICC.  However innocuous the ICC’s 
operations in Africa may be, global institutions are not always “optimally efficient” and different regions 
may have “regional particularities that global mechanisms cannot penetrate.”485  The forces of 
regionalism, Pan-Africanism, and the ICC’s failure to manage the crisis with the AU have allowed for a 
rhetoric and practice of “African solutions to African problems” to take hold.  The development of the 
regional criminal tribunal can be understood as an embodiment of this statement.  African states may have 
surmised that, if the ICC is going to focus its energies on Africa, then it is a reasonable response to create 
an African regime with personnel and judges from the region.486  The likelihood of norm promotion may 
also be greater as a result, due to the proximity of the regional body to the communities impacted by the 
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human rights violations.487  It is also conceivable that the regional body may be similarly distant from the 
place of the crimes as the ICC and that its remoteness could impact its effectiveness.488   
There are numerous political, financial, and other obstacles that may impede the regional criminal 
court’s ability to offer a robust alternative.  Once established, the regional criminal court will likely also 
face credibility issues.  It is likely that the court will face challenges regarding political will to enforce 
decisions, funding constraints, and the issue of official immunity.  Additionally, the regional court will 
probably encounter challenges ensuring international fair trial standards and conducting its proceedings 
with sufficient transparency.  Moreover, the court will likely have difficulty guarding against bias 
accusations, particularly when the individuals or entities are from outside of the African region.  
Furthermore, the regional criminal court may suffer from less judicial and lawyering experience than 
exists at the international level.  The regional criminal court may also face similar challenges that the ICC 
has in the selection of its cases and the timing of indictments given peace and justice considerations.  
Likewise, the limitations of regionalism might make an escape to a universal system as a potential check 
necessary.  For example, regional powers may tend to distort or even abuse regional processes489 by using 
the court to further political aims or protecting allies from the court’s reach.  Yet, the danger of political 
manipulation is present at the national, regional, and international level.  It may be that the regional level 
presents a useful midway point of balancing these concerns.490  The regional body might achieve a 
healthy balance between the local and the international with the former being too close and susceptible to 
political capture of local elites, and the latter being too remote to fully appreciate context. 
For all of the reasons enumerated above, the regional criminal court may be able to position itself 
as the institution with the most resonance on the Continent.  The ICC’s institutional crisis makes it 
unlikely that it will be able to fulfill the role of a comprehensive institution in the near future.  The ICC, 
faced with a growing legitimacy gap in Africa, needed to engage in “legitimation” to justify its roles and 
practices and ground them in the wider social context.491  Yet, the ICC has failed to do so, which has led 
to the emergence of a regime complex and a burgeoning regime shift. 
 
3. Regionalization of International Criminal Law 
This Article has shown that regional integration efforts allow for innovation and can influence the 
development of regime complexes.  Of course, regional integration efforts are also occurring in other 
areas of the world.  However, the unique mixture of deepening regional integration and the crisis the ICC 
is facing in Africa has led to the development of an emerging regime complex in international criminal 
justice.  The ICC has not penetrated or intervened in any other region as much as it has in Africa, so it 
makes sense that this would occur in Africa first.  This subsection examines the potential implications of 
the regionalization of international criminal law.    
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Reconstituting international criminal justice as a regional idea will add significance to 
international criminal law as a “concrete and not abstract concept.”492  Regional systems benefit from 
states with greater socioeconomic, environmental, and security interdependence, because it encourages 
greater compliance with the decisions of regional bodies.493  Other scholars have also argued convincingly 
that “regional problems of criminality deserve regional approaches.”494  For example, one scholar has 
asserted that regionalism can 
provide a hitherto unavailable means of balancing the benefits and dangers of both 
supranational and national enforcement.  In terms of cost, legitimacy, political 
independence, and judicial reconstruction, regionalization may be a normatively 
preferable means of enforcing international criminal law, [which] merits attention as a 
viable part of a system of international criminal law enforcement.495 
Regional mechanisms like the criminal tribunal can help to serve as intermediaries “between the state’s 
domestic institutions which violate or fail to enforce human rights and the global human rights system 
which alone cannot provide redress to all individual victims of human rights violations.”496  The ICC will 
never be able to deal with all situations involving international crimes, and even where it does operate, the 
issuance of lop-sided indictments means that a criminality gap will persist.  The regional criminal court 
could theoretically help to fill this gap by prosecuting situations that the ICC does not, by prosecuting 
quotidian crimes the Rome Statute does not cover, and by prosecuting individuals and entities that the 
ICC has not indicted or cannot indict.  The creation of a regional court may allow the ICC to concentrate 
its attention on the most severe international situations, allowing it to dedicate its limited resources and 
staff most effectively.   
A regional approach will similarly limit the difficulties of determining competing claims to the 
“duty to prosecute,”497 and trying to balance one society’s rights and interests over another as well as 
balancing victims’ rights, by attempting to adjudicate which society “has the most valid claim in any one 
case.”498  A regional body would circumvent situations where several states have a keen interest in 
exercising jurisdiction, and where one state’s exercise of jurisdiction inevitably frustrates the aspiration of 
the other state(s).499  A regional court’s jurisdiction could be based on the reality of the conflict lines, 
both territorially and temporally.  Significantly, this means that the regional court could be able to 
investigate and prosecute crimes occurring in all affected states.  Investigations and prosecutions could 
examine all aspects of criminality including the transnational nature of abuses, and not arbitrarily 
focus on one select instance, limiting the problems posed by lopsided prosecutions and 
investigations.500  A regional approach would also deal with double jeopardy concerns raised by the 
possibility of multiple prosecutions from different states.   
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A regional body could presumably fulfill the interests of all affected States in seeking 
“justice,”501 instead of the current situational approach of the ICC, which atomizes conflicts.  For example 
the ICC’s prosecution of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a former Vice President and warlord from the 
DRC,502 for allegedly committing war crimes in the neighboring Central African Republic does not 
address any violations he allegedly committed in the DRC.503  Prosecuting select instances of criminality 
is unsatisfactory and victims from the DRC’s interests in Bemba’s prosecution might be negatively 
impacted by the ICC’s failure to adopt a regional approach.504  A regional tribunal will be better equipped 
to address the regional dimensions of many conflicts and could be seen as a better arbiter than national or 
international tribunals.  Moreover, given the analysis above, regional action might be preferable to 
international action, particularly in situations where massive violations have taken place across societies 
in a region.   
The increasing relevance of regionalism in international relations could also influence other 
regions to expand the sphere of influence of their regional bodies from economic integration to human 
rights issues, and even to international criminal law and systemic quotidian violations.  The legal 
borrowing or “transplanting” of institutions505 to different regions is by no means a recent phenomenon.506  
States may even seek to create regional customary criminal law for some behaviors that are endemic to 
particular regions.  For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed a rich 
jurisprudence on the “right to truth” and forced disappearances due to the prevalence of authoritarian 
regimes in the region.507  Similarly, the regional criminal court in Africa could develop a regional 
jurisprudence on such crimes as piracy, or the unconstitutional change of government due to the 
prevalence of these issues in Africa.508  The emergence of a regime complex in international criminal law 
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would allow for regional innovation and differentiation on the crimes worthy of regional, if not 
international, attention.   
Admittedly, the generalizability of my analysis is limited, as I only provided an in-depth analysis 
of one region.  My analysis above is also very state-centric and does not adequately examine the role of 
non-state actors like non-governmental organizations, and individuals’ views on regionalization.  Much 
more research is needed using other regions to determine definitively how these factors are playing out 
elsewhere.  It is unclear whether we will see the regionalization of international criminal justice issues in 
other regions.  Yet, according to one scholar, regions have been “the defining characteristic of the modern 
generation of international tribunals.”509  Indeed, there is already some evidence that regional human 
rights bodies are beginning to address international criminal law issues outside of Africa.  For example, 
the Inter-American Court has required and is monitoring the prosecutions of international criminal law 
violations in approximately fifty-one cases across fifteen states.510  The quasi-criminal review of the Inter-
American Court puts greater emphasis on fostering national prosecutions and is more deferential to local 
processes of justice.511  This mechanism for fostering international criminal accountability in the 
Americas goes beyond the court’s strictly human rights mandate.512  The Inter-American Court innovated 
by construing prosecutions for international criminal law violations as an equitable remedy to human 
rights violations.513  The African human rights system is improving on this innovation by seeking to 
adjudicate both international criminal law violations and systematic quotidian crimes regionally.  This is 
noteworthy when one considers that “no state has ever fully complied with an Inter-American Court order 
to prosecute or punish an international crime.”514  Both regions indicate that the expansion of the sphere 
of influence of regional human rights bodies to encompass international criminal law issues is a 
phenomenon that is not fleeting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The main take away from the above analysis is that regionalism can influence the development of 
regime complexes.  In addition, crises are important predictors of institutional change and development.  
Moreover, regional integration efforts may allow for innovation and expand to include criminal law and 
certain aspects of international criminal law.  This Article has identified an emerging regime complex in a 
previously unacknowledged area.  Over time, if there is a convergence of the interests of states, the ICC 
could emerge as a comprehensive institution.  Yet, the present reality suggests that a regime complex in 
the field of international criminal law is here to stay.  International justice advocates may be concerned 
that the regionalization of international criminal law will result in a concession to moral relativism, or a 
return to hegemons exercising outsized influence over particular regions.  Yet, if the field of international 
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human rights law is any indication, regionalization of international criminal law may lead to greater 
enforcement and promotion than is possible at the international or domestic level. 
 
